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THE RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL CRITIQUE:
FROM JUDICIAL RESTRAINT TO THE VIRTUAL BILL OF
RIGHTS
Michael J. Gerhardt'

ProfessorMichael Gerhardttraces the rhetoricemployed by nationalleaders
and commentators over the past century to describe popularconceptions of the
judicialfunction. In particular,ProfessorGerhardtexamines the evolution of the
terminology used in popularand political rhetoric, revealing their inconsistent
applicationto political ideologies through time. Professor Gerhardtargues that
such shifts in usage correspond with transfers of power between the political
authoritiescontrollingthe centralinterestsat stake in constitutionaladjudication.
ProfessorGerhardtapplies the shortcomingsof traditionalpoliticalrhetoricto the
issues surrounding technological advancements, concluding that the proper
treatment of technology by the Supreme Court in the twenty-first century will
requirerecognition of the complex consequencesposed by these advances.
INTRODUCTION

A look back on the importance of the Bill of Rights in American history
provides a glimpse into its future. The circumstances at the turn of the century are
illustrative: Recall that the overwhelming focus of political commentary was not
on the new president's conception of the Bill of Rights or even his constitutional
vision, but rather on the extent to which the bizarre path by which he had achieved
office would undermine the legitimacy of his presidency. In their appraisals of the
new president, Democrats and liberals spent much more time questioning his
competence than his philosophy: They accused of him of being an intellectual
lightweight who had been born with a silver spoon in his mouth, had a reckless past,
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Constitutional Law, William & Mary Law School.
B.A. Yale University, M.Sc. London School of Economics, J.D. University of Chicago. I
am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky, Neal Devins, Dave Douglas, Marty Flaherty, Dave
Garrow, Deborah Gerhardt, Bill Marshall, Alan Meese, and Paul Schwartz for helpful
comments on portions of this Article; and to Paul Dame, William & Mary Law School Class
of 2003, for his excellent research assistance.
I completed this Article well before the terrorist attacks directed against the United
States on September 11, 2001. Though national political leaders united not long thereafter
to pass legislation expanding federal authority to combat terrorism, it is of course too soon
to predict or fully assess the implications of the war on terrorism for the rhetoric of'judicial
critique. The key questions likely to divide (and perhaps define the differences among)
people involve: (1) the proper balance between respecting civil liberties and protecting
national security; (2)the relative scope of presidential and congressional authority to combat
terrorism; and (3)the relative scopes of federal and state executive and legislative authorities
to combat terrorism. To date, the primary locus for debate of these questions has been in
political rather than judicial fora.
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and had become a presence in national politics primarily because of his family's
name, connections, and friends. Pundits worried that, because of his inexperience
in national politics, the new president might be prone to be led by the strong rightwing leaders of his party; many, including some of the president's most ardent
supporters, wondered whether he truly was as conservative as he claimed to be.
Democrats and liberals were especially critical of the Republican-dominated
Supreme Court, which they considered, like the new president and the Republicanled Congress, to be captive to corporate interests. They denounced the Court for its
arrogance and for being filled with conservative activists bent on usurping
congressional authority.
In this familiar picture, the Bill of Rights was far from center stage. Yet the
familiarity should caution us, for the picture is not based on recent events. The
circumstances I have described were the state of political affairs not in the year
2001, but rather 1901. The president to whom I referred is not George W. Bush, but
rather Theodore Roosevelt, who became the youngest person ever to become
president as a result of President William McKinley's assassination.' The Supreme
Court to which I referred was led not by the staunch Republican William Rehnquist,
but rather a Democrat, Melville Fuller,2 who led a Court dominated by Republicans
for over two decades during an era that took its name from one of the most
controversial Supreme Court opinions of the times - Lochner v. New York.3
Ifthe political circumstances in 1901 and 2001 seem similar, it is partly because
we continue to use much of the same rhetoric for critiquing judicial activity and
ideology as commentators did over a century ago. It is particularly striking when
one considers this usage persists in spite of the changes in agendas of national
political leaders, including the Civil Rights Movement and the process of
incorporation by which the Supreme Court made the vast majority of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. The change in the Court's agenda has not coincided
with or precipitated a change in terms of popular debate about the role of the
Supreme Court in the American political, social, and legal order. The increasing
prominence of the Bill of Rights in our legal order has not changed political
rhetoric, but rather, been a function of the ideological drift that helps to explain how
different conceptions become appropriated by very different political and
intellectual movements over time.
The purpose ofthis Article is to sketch the evolution of the usage and meanings
of our public rhetoric about the Supreme Court. The terms that constitute the bulk
For the extraordinary path by which Theodore Roosevelt became McKinley's running
mate in 1900 and his successor in 1901, see generally H.W. BRANDS, T.R.: THE LAST
ROMANTIC 3-434 (1997).
2 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,
1888-19 10
(1995).
' 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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of this rhetoric - "conservative," "liberal," "judicial activist," 'judicial
usurpation," and "judicial restraint" - have been fixtures in the lexicon ofjudicial
critique throughout the past one hundred years. The usage of these terms has been
constant, but the subjects to which they have referred have not. In this Article, I try
to clarify these subjects, including the Bill of Rights. My focus is more on the
meanings of these terms and concepts in popular and political rhetoric, of which
they have been a constant part, and less on the precise intellectual or philosophical
movements that these terms have signified or reflected over the past century. Thus,
the focus is primarily on the public statements of national leaders (including
justices) and commentators. My focus extends to the records of or commentary on
judicial confirmation contests, which tend to provide the most highly visible
circumstance in which political leaders express and attempt to shape popular
conceptions of different judicial approaches to construction of the meaning of the
Bill of Rights. The sketch I derive from these sources is primarily descriptive; I
draw on primary and secondary materials to trace the path by which these terms
have come to apply to different conceptions of the judicial function over time. This
focus helps to illuminate the political objectives served by the usage of these terms,
perhaps the most important of which has been to characterize judicial activity in
politically salient images.
Moreover, studying the evolution of our popular rhetoric helps to illuminate its
limitations. In some important ways, it has impeded, rather than facilitated, greater
public understanding ofjudicial activity. It obscures the fact that some notions cast
as ideals, such as judicial restraint, do not belong and are not the province of any
single perspective on constitutional adjudication, but rather have belonged to or
served different politically driven conceptions of the judicial function in different
periods.
The rhetoric ofjudicial critique is not likely to capture easily the complexity or
full range of consequences of the great constitutional issue likely to dominate the
next century. In the twentieth century, the dominant constitutional issue tended to
be the relationship between the State and the national economy. Questions about
the relationship between government and technology entered the national debate at
the beginning of the twentieth century, because of economic and social disparities
resulting from mass industrialization, and near the end of the century in debates
over abortion rights. In the twenty-first century, the great constitutional issue is
likely to be the relationship more generally between the government and
technology. The latter issue is decidedly distinct from questions about the meaning
or significance of federalism because advancements in technology are likely to
obscure state and federal boundaries. Moreover, these advancements are likely to
increase the gap between constitutional doctrine and political reality. I refer to
these advancements as helping to shape a "Virtual Bill of Rights," by which I mean
that the Supreme Court is invariably so far behind technological advancements that
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it can never keep pace with them. This problem culminates in the likelihood that
the Court's decisions, as a practical matter, will make little or no difference to the
impact of these advancements on the various individual liberty interests implicated
by them. Once the Court gets around to ruling on any of these technical questions,
the technology on which it will have ruled already will have expired or morphed.
The challenge is to enrich our political rhetoric about the Court to capture the
complexity and significance of these circumstances. If we fail to meet this
challenge, we can expect our language and thinking about the issues posed by
technological progress to be stuck in the past.
I. PROGRESSIVISM TO CONSERVATISM,

1900-1921

It is tempting to treat the terms that are most commonly employed for
describing political and judicial activity as if they had meant the same things in
different historical periods. The great political historian Richard Hofstadter fell
prey to this temptation when he characterized conservatism primarily as directed at
preserving the status quo and liberalism largely as the movement toward reform.4
Such definitions however, are misleading and inadequate. Defining conservatism
as being preoccupied with the preservation or protection of the status quo and
liberalism as being largely, if not wholly, about reform does not explain aggressive
judicial obstruction ofeconomic regulations in the name of conservatism or extreme
judicial deference to progressive economic regulations on behalf of liberalism.
A more useful characterization of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" would
be to describe whetherjudges have supported or struck down programs and policies
commonly associated with or reflecting "conservative" or "liberal" politics. Hence,
the justices most commonly regarded as "conservative" in the 1930s were the "Four
Horsemen" - Justices McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter - who
were widely regarded as "activists" because they voted to strike down laws
reflecting "liberal" values, while the "liberal"justices of the era were Harlan Fiske

Stone, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis Brandeis because they deferred to such
legislation.' Understanding how the terms conservative and liberal were bandied
about in this fashion promotes some understanding of their significance, but this
understanding is limited too, because it fails to provide a complete picture of
judicial politics throughout the twentieth century. One ultimately needs to examine

the political contexts in which these terms have been employed and the political
purposes served by their usage to develop a more comprehensive picture.
A useful starting point for developing this picture is the year 1900. In 1900,
conservatism was on the verge of a serious confrontation with the forces of
4

See RiCHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R 13-15

(1955).
' See infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
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progressivism.6 In the national government, conservatism was represented most
visibly in the form of the Fuller Court, which had provoked some strident public
criticism for upholding economic due process claims to strike down business
regulations in such cases as Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v.
New York.7
One of the most strident critics of the Court was the Republican President
Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt had his own novel conception of conservatism.
Roosevelt thought of himself as a conservative, though not in conventional terms.'
For him, the true conservative had to be progressive in outlook. He believed "[t]he
only true conservative is the man who resolutely sets his face to the future."9 He
was disturbed by the fact that during the 1890s the Republican Party had abandoned
the "radical" posture that he believed was its birthright in national politics. ° In his
view, the "foolish, ill-judged, mock radicalism" of the Democrats, populists, and
socialists had pushed the Republican Party to fight for economic justice from a
dangerously "conservative" and defensive position."1 As president, Roosevelt
openly worried that the Republican Party risked "fossilization," that is, a disastrous
identification with the propertied classes rather than the common people whom
Roosevelt saw as his most important constituency. 2 To help the Republican Party
meet the demands posed by mass industrialization, national organization of the
economy, and the rise of America as a world power, Roosevelt sought to make "an
old party progressive again."' 3 In short, the "progressive position" that Roosevelt
sought to stake out for himself and his administration was to be "conservativeradicalism."' 4 This formulation was a variation on a theme Roosevelt traced back
to Edmund Burke, whom Roosevelt often liked to quote as acknowledging that

6 For

some useful overviews on political and constitutional thinking at or around the
beginning of the last century, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGALTHOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 83-115 (2000); G.

Edward White, From SociologicalJurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social
Change in Early Twentieth-CenturyAmerica, 59 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972), reprintedin G.
EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 99-135 (1978).
7 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruledby Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
a Progressives in Congress were no less enamored of the Court. They proposed, in vain,
to require a two-thirds vote by the justices when striking down statutes, and permitting
Congress to overrule the Court's decisions by a two-thirds majority. DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN POLmCS 363 (5th ed. 2000).
9 JOHN MORTON BLUM, THE REPUBLICAN ROOSEVELT 5 (2d ed. 1972) (citation omitted).
'0 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLrrics PRESIDENTS MAKE 235 (2d ed. 1997) (citation
omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
12 Id. (citation omitted).
13 Id. at 236 (citation omitted).
" Letter to Sydney Brooks (Nov. 20, 1908), in SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 237.
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"[t]here is a state to preserve as well a state to reform."'' 5
Roosevelt viewed the advent of economic due process as a threat to his
"conservative-radicalism."' 6 As president, Roosevelt frequently denounced the
Supreme Court as "conservative and hidebound."' 7 As president, he yearned to
appoint "liberal" justices who would support the progressive policies of his
administration.'" He did not hesitate to denounce his appointees, including Oliver
Wendell Holmes, when they failed to vote as he hoped.'9
Roosevelt's "conservative-radicalism," and particularly his antipathy tojudicial
activism, eventually placed him at odds with his chosen successor, William Howard
Taft. Not long after Taft became president in 1908, Roosevelt concluded that Taft
was betraying Roosevelt's brand of conservatism. By 1910, Roosevelt complained
that Taft had "not proved [to be] a good leader, in spite of his having been a good

"SSee, e.g., Edmund Burke, Address Before the Opening of the Jamestown Exposition
(Apr. 26, 1907), 6 WORKS 1213-28, in SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 237.
16 See, e.g. Theodore Roosevelt, Criticism of the Courts, THE OUTLOOK, XVI 149-53
(Sept. 24, 1910), reprintedin HOWARD FURER, 5 THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN LIFE:
THE FULLER COURT 1888-1910, at 213 (George J. Lankevich ed., 1986):

All who are acquainted with the effort to remedy industrial abuses know the
type of mind (it may be perfectly honest, but is absolutely fossilized), which
declines to allow us to work for the betterment of conditions among the wage
earners on the ground that we must not interfere with the "liberty" of a girl to
work under conditions which jeopardize life and limb, or the "liberty" of a man
to work under conditions which ruin his health after a limited number of years
....The decision was nominally against states' rights, but was really against

popular rights.
Id.
'7

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OFTHE U.S.

SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 117 (rev. ed. 1999)

(citation omitted in original).
S On this subject, Roosevelt wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: "I should hold
myself as guilty of an irreparable wrong to the nation if I should put [on the Court] any man
who was not absolutely sane and sound on the great national policies for which we stand in
public life." 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND
HENRY CABOT LODGE, 1884-1918, at 519 (H.C. Lodge & C.F. Redmond eds., 1925),
reprintedin HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 157 (3d ed. 1992). For Roosevelt, those policies

included support for labor, anti-trust laws, improved race relations, and increased regulatory
power of the national government.
"9In response to Holmes's opinions in a series of antitrust cases that went against
administration policy, Roosevelt fumed: "Icould carve out of a banana a Judge with more
backbone than that!" ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 69 (citation omitted).
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first lieutenant."2 ° In 1911, Roosevelt derided Taft as "a flubdub with a streak of
second-rate and the common in him, and he has not the slightest idea of what is
necessary if this country is to make social and industrial progress." 2 '
Roosevelt's concerns about Taft's Supreme Court appointees' rigid adherence
to economic due process and to the possible radicalism of Woodrow Wilson's
appointees22 fortified his decision to run as a third-party presidential candidate in
1912. In February of that year, Roosevelt declared, "I... emphatically protest
against any theory that would make of the Constitution a means of thwarting instead
of securing the absolute right of the people to rule themselves and provide for their
social and industrial well-being,.. . 'whether on the bench, in the legislature or in
executive office.', 2 3 In June, Roosevelt rallied his supporters for the Republican
Convention with the cry, "we stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord."24
His platform as a third-party candidate included a controversial plea for the judicial
recall of federal judges. This plea triggered a widespread critical reaction,
including grumbling from a New York conservative that Roosevelt's attack "had
startled all thoughtful men and impressed them with the frightful danger which lies
in his political ascendancy[,]" 25 as well as from the Republican leadership, in the
person of William Howard Taft.26
On the public stage, Roosevelt was hardly alone in condemning judicial
activism (in those days often synonymous with economic due process). As early as
1894, Oregon Governor Sylvester Pennoyer launched a blistering attack on the
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot (June 28, 1910), in LEWIS L.
GOULD, REFORM ANDREGULATION: AMERICAN POLITICS FROM ROOSEVELTTO WILSON 135
(2d ed. 1986).
21 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (Aug. 22, 1911), in
20

GOULD, supra note 20, at 149.
22 See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
23

WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT & CONSTITUTION INTHE 20TH CENTURY: THE OLD

LEGALITY 1889-1932, at 159 (1969) (citation omitted).
24 Theodore Roosevelt, Address on the Eve of the Republican Convention of 1912, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1912, in WALTER F. PRATr, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD
DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910-1921, at 2 (1999).
25 GOULD, supra note 21, at 139 (citation omitted in original).
26

In response to these attacks, Taft stated: "What distinguishes this country from any

other one is the Supreme Court ... and to turn on that Court... and attack it seems to me

to lay the axe at the root of the tree of our civilization." N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 6, 1911,
at 1, in ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 57 (1964). Taft also
portrayed Roosevelt as one of a group of "extremists" who were "not progressives.. . [but]
political emotionalists or neurotics." GOULD, supra note 20, at 154. In private
correspondence, Taft candidly revealed his fundamental concerns about Roosevelt. In July
1912, he wrote that "[Roosevelt] is really the greatest menace to our institutions that we have
had in a long time - indeed I don't remember one in our history so dangerous and so
powerful because of his hold upon the less intelligent votes and the discontented." HERBERT
S. DUFFY, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 299 (1930).
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Fuller Court's protection of property rights. He declared:
We have during this time been living under a government not based
upon the Federal Constitution, but under one created by the plausible
sophistries of John Marshall. The Supreme Court has not contented
itself with its undisputed judicial prerogative of interpreting the laws of
Congress which may be ambiguous, but it has usurped the legislative
prerogative of declaring what the laws shall not be. Our constitutional
government has been supplanted by a judicial oligarchy."
A less vitriolic, but no less severe, critique came from Labor leader Samuel
Gompers, who stated in 1913:
It took years to secure relief from the old conspiracy laws which curbed
and restricted the workers in protecting and promoting their industrial
rights and interests. When at last it seemed that efforts of the toilers
were to be rewarded, then the Supreme Court of the United States, by an
interpretation which amounted to judicial legislation, applied the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law to trade unions in a way which virtually
revived the conspiracy laws.2'
Similarly, the Socialist Party included the following plank in its 1912 campaign
platform: "The abolition of the power usurped by the Supreme Court of the United
States to pass upon the constitutionality of the legislation enacted by Congress.
National laws to be repealed only by act of Congress or by a referendum vote of the
'
whole people."29
In addition to the harsh criticism of the Court by many political leaders, there
was significant critical reaction to judicial activism within the legal academy,
magazines, and the judiciary. Harvard Law School Professor James Thayer becarne
an early, influential critic of the judicial activism that economic due process
spawned.30 In the same year that Justice David Brewer gave a fiery address at the
American Bar Association in defense of judicial opposition to "the red flag of
"' Sylvester Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision,and the Power of the Supreme Court
to Nullify Acts of Congress, 29 AM. L. REV. 550, 558 (1895), reprinted in 2 CHARILES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 703 (1937) (emphasis added).
28 Letter from Samuel Gompers to President Woodrow Wilson, reprinted
in NORmAN
BINDLER, 6 THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE CONSERVATIVE COURT 19101930, at 67 (George J. Lankevich ed., 1986).
29 Socialist Party Platform (1912), reprinted in NORMAN BNDLER, 6 THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE CONSERVATIVE COURT, 1910-1930, at 91 (George J.
Lankevich ed., 1986).
30 ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 42 (1964).
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Socialism, inviting a redistribution of property,"' Thayer urged judicial restraint.32
He warned that judicial review did not imply judicial supremacy. In the face of
' Thayer pleaded
Justice Brewer's inflammatory call to "strengthen the judiciary,"33
instead for principled judicial restraint. He declared:
[Judicial self-restraint] recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex,
ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so
to another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations;
that there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the
constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion,
but leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational
is constitutional.34
According to Thayer, the judicial function was "merely that of fixing the outside
border of reasonable legislative action[.]" Power of such modest dimension would
leave courts "a great and stately jurisdiction. It will only imperil the whole of it, if
it is sought to give them more."36
The article was more than just an academic exercise, for Thayer's thinking on
the legitimacy of judicial review would influence a generation of Harvard Law
School graduates, including his colleague Holmes, as well as Learned Hand, Louis
Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter.3 7 Indeed, as a Supreme Court justice, Holmes
31

32

Id. (citation omitted in original).
See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of

ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 156 (1893):

[T]he safe and permanent road towards reform is that of impressing upon our
people a far stronger sense than they have of the great range of possible harm and
evil that our system leaves open, and must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the
clear limits ofjudicial power; so that responsibility may be brought sharply home
where it belongs.
Id.
33

David J. Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, 16 PROC. N.Y. ST. B.A. 37, 37-47 (1893),

reprintedin MASON, supranote 30, at 43.
14

Thayer, supra note 32, at 144.

31 Id. at 148.

Id. at 152.
37 See G.Edward White, Revisiting JamesBradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L.. REv. 48 (1993);
36

In the early twentieth century, Thayer's essay.. . was 'discovered' by a group of
,progressive' legal scholars and policymakers, personified by Felix Frankfurter,
and introduced into the canons of 'approved' constitutional scholarship. Thayer's
essay was read as endorsing a deferential posture for judges.., and applauded as
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became the leading advocate for judicial restraint and against judicial activism."
Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York 9 was, both then and now, generally
regarded as a major attack on activism. He echoed this same theme repeatedly in
his private correspondence,' as well as in public addresses.4 A more colorful
example of Holmes's commitment to judicial restraint came in an exchange with
John W. Davis in 1916 regarding a series of cases dealing with the Sherman Antia prescient exemplar of judicial self-restraint.
Id. at 48-49.
Is See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHrrE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 352-53 (1982)
(describing Holmes's attacks on judicial activism).
'9 For example, Holmes wrote:
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire.
It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our
finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not
to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting), overruled by
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
0 In 1910, Holmes wrote to long-time confidant Sir Frederick Pollock: "I am so
sceptical [sic] as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws that I have no
practical criticism except what the crowd wants. Personally I bet that the crowd if it knew
more wouldn't want what it does - but that is immaterial." Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 23, 1910), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
1874-1932, at
163 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). Holmes again expresses this sentiment in a 1914
letter to Felix Frankfurter, writing:
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR[.] JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK

I quite agree that a law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant

forces of the community even if it will take us to hell. But if one sees that result
clearly, one may suspect that the community would change its will if it had the
same wisdom.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 24, 1914), in HOLMES AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIRCORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 19 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine
L. Compston eds., 1996).
4' For example, in a speech at Harvard in 1913, Holmes stated: "It is a misfortune if a
judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely
into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his
fellow men to be wrong." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, Address at a Dinner
of the Harvard Law School Association (Feb. 15, 1913), reprintedin NORMAN BINDLER, 6
THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN LIFE: THE CONSERVATIVE COURT 1910-1930, at 62-64
(George J. Lankevich ed., 1986).
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Trust Act. Holmes said: "Of course I know and every other sensible man knows
that the Sherman law is damned nonsense, but if my fellow citizens want to go to
hell, I am here to help them - it's my job." 2 Whether it reflected pragmatism,
consequentialism, or some other more esoteric view of the world,"3 Holmes's
antipathy to judicial activism and calls for judicial restraint became nationally
synonymous with a "liberal" outlook.
After his elevation to the Court, Wilson's friend and Supreme Court appointee
Louis Brandeis joined Holmes in attacking judicial activism (that interfered with
economic reform) and defending judicial restraint. One of the few areas in which
they both saw a legitimate role forjudicial interference with democratic enactments
was the First Amendment, though more often than not, they joined in dissent.'
Holmes's and Brandeis's frequent agreement in civil liberties cases, as well as in
opposing judicial activism in business regulation cases, helped to cultivate their
joint reputations publicly as "liberals."4' 5
Learned Hand, too, joined the attack on economic due process. In 1908, in the
pages of the Harvard Law Review, he wrote:
42 GARY J. AICHELE, OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JUDGE

140

(John Milton Cooper, Jr., ed., 1989) (citation omitted).
43 For conflicting views on the philosophic underpinnings of Holmes's judicial outlook,
see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF

JUSTICE HOLMES (2000); LouIs MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
4
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting) (holding New York statute against "criminal anarchy" not violative of the First
Amendment); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(holding the distribution of pamphlets advocating resistance to World War I in violation of
the Espionage Act as not being protected by the First Amendment); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding the distribution of a circular advocating draft dodging
in violation of the Espionage Act as not being protected by the First Amendment).
4' A 1927 newspaper article concluded:

Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis... have achieved a spiritual
kinship that marks them off as a separate liberal chamber of the Supreme Court. On
the great issues that go down to the fundamental differences in the philosophy of
government these two are nearly always together; often they are together against
the rest of the court.
Charles G. Ross, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 19, 1927, in SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, THE
LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 94 (1956) (citation omitted). The frequent labeling of
Holmes as a "liberal" in his time drew the ire of H.L. Mencken, who in 1955 wrote that
"[t]he Liberals,. . .who long for tickling with a great and tragic longing, were occasionally
lifted to the heights of ecstasy by the learned judge's operations, and in fact soared so high
that they were out of earshot of next day's thwack of the club." Hadley Arkes, Lochner v.
New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in GREAT CASES INCONSTITUTIONAL LAw 94, 116

(Robert P. George ed., 2000) (citation omitted) [hereinafter GREAT CASES].
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It is not, however, necessary that the consideration by the court of the
expediency of a statute should be such as would be given if the whole
question were before it as a legislature in the first instance.... The nearest
analogy for the function of the court is the function of a court in review of
a verdict on the facts. Only in those cases in which it is obvious beyond
peradventure that the statute was the result, either of passion or of
ignorance or folly, can the court say that it was not due process of law. In
this way the principle may be observed that with the expediency of the
statute the court has no concern, but only with the power of the
legislature.'
'Privately, Hand expressed his agreement with Roosevelt's condemnation ofjudicial
obstructionism.4" Even more importantly for Hand's future, his attack caught the
attention of Taft's Attorney General, George Wickersham, who helped to secure
Hand an appointment as a federal district judge." Later, after becoming chief
justice, Taft opposed elevating Hand to the Supreme Court because of his age and
his strident opposition to economic due process.49
In 1913, historian Charles Warren described the political controversy
enveloping the Supreme Court at the time:
During the past two years, there has been much agitation directed against
the Supreme Court of the United States, frequent reference to "judicial
oligarchy," "usurpation" and the like, and demands for fundamental
changes in the judicial system under the Constitution, not only of the States
but of the United States.50
Warren explained that the years 1887 to 1911 "constituted the period most
productive of progressive and liberal -

even radical -

social and economic

legislation in the United States."'" He noted the Court had struck down laws for
violating the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses in only three cases,5" though
' Learned Hand, Due Processof Law andthe Eight-HourDay, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495,
499-500 (1908) (internal citations omitted).
41-See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 212-13 (1994)

(describing and quoting from exchanges between Hand and Roosevelt on judicial activism
and the propriety ofjudicial recall).
41 Id. at 129-33.
49 Id. at 239, 274-75.
'oCharles Warren, The Progressivenessofthe UnitedStates Supreme Court,13 COLUM.
L. REV. 294, 294 (1913), in PRATr,supra note 24, at 7.
51 Id.

52 Warren suggested those three decisions were Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45

(1905), Connolly v. UnionSewer PipeCo., 184 U.S. 540 (1902), and Allgeyer v. Louisiana,

20021

THE RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL CRITIQUE

he conceded that the Supreme Court had struck down laws thirty-four times to
protect private property rights during the same period.
Although the decisions in which the Fuller and White Courts took on politically
charged issues were relatively small in number, the criticism of the Supreme Court
grew increasingly harsh during the first couple decades of the twentieth century.
By 1921, at the end of Edward Douglass White's tenure as chief justice, a
contemporary observer suggested that the:
[H]istorian of the future will probably say that at the time Mr. White was
appointed Chief Justice, the Supreme Court, as well as the entire judiciary
in America, was passing through the most distinct crisis in its history. The
public had become suddenly distrustful of our courts and resented the
absolute power of the judicial veto. Recall of judges as well as recall of
judicial decisions was one of the flaming issues of the day. Indeed,
antagonism to the power ofjudges was one ofthe basic creeds of a nascent
political faith. 3
Perhaps no one defended the Court more vigorously against this "antagonism" than
William Howard Taft. The path by which Taft came to lead the Court and the
direction in which he helped to lead it are extremely important for understanding
the meanings of both conservatism and liberalism prior to the New Deal.

II. TAFT AND THE TAFT COURT, 1921-30
It is hard to imagine anyone matching the extraordinary public service of
William Howard Taft. From 1881 to 1930, he served as a public prosecutor and
state court judge in Ohio, Solicitor General of the United States, circuit court judge,
Governor General of the Philippines, Secretary of War, President of the United
States, Yale Law School professor, President of the American Bar Association, and
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.L ' In all of these positions, he had
unique opportunities to articulate and advance his conservative constitutional
vision.
Taft developed his judicial philosophy relatively early in life and asserted it
consistently throughout his career. In a well-publicized speech before the American
Bar Association in 1895, Taft, then a circuit judge, tried to refute charges that the
federal courts had "flagrantly usurped jurisdiction, first, to protect corporations and
perpetuate their many uses, and second, to oppress and destroy the power of
165 U.S. 578 (1897).
" Samuel Spring, Two ChiefJustices: EdwardDouglass White and William Howard
Taft, 64 THE AM. REV. OF REvs. 163-64 (Aug. 1921), in PRATr, supranote 24, at 8.
14 See generally MASON, supra note 30,passim.
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organized labor."" He suggested the federal courts were being "subjected to the
most severe criticism without just grounds, merely because of the character of their
jurisdiction."56 He explained that "[c]ourts are but conservators; they cannot effect
great social and political changes. Corporations there must be if we would
progress; accumulation of wealth there will be if private property continues the
keystone of our society."" Thus, he believed legislation to regulate the excesses of
private property must be narrow in scope. The excesses of labor were, in his view,
more amenable to judicial action because courts had the authority to issue
injunctions when labor violated property rights.
In a lecture at Yale in 1906, Taft recalled fondly his opinions upon his own
graduation from Yale in 1878:
The tendency in my own case... was toward the laissezfaire doctrine
that the least interference by legislation with the operation of natural
laws was, in the end, the best for the public; that the only proper object
of legislation was to free the pathway of commerce and opportunity from
the effect ofeverything but competition and enlightened selfishness; and
that being done, the Government had discharged all of its proper
functions. 8
He reiterated this same philosophy in 1912 in making the case for the Republican
Party to pick him, rather than Roosevelt, as its standard-bearer:
I believe I represent a safer and saner view of our government and its
constitution than does Theodore Roosevelt, and ... I mean to continue
to labor. . . to uphold them and.., to stamp out the pernicious theory

that the method of reforming the defects in a representative government
is to impose more numerous and more burdensome political duties upon
the people when their inability properly to discharge their present duties
is the cause of every ground of complaint.59
S5 William Howard Taft, Criticismsofthe FederalJudiciary,
Annual Address Delivered
Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 28, 1895), inXXIV AM. L.REV. 641-74 (1895),
in MASON, supra note 30, at 47. The charges were directed at the Court's hampering
enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, barring a direct federal income tax, upholding
the injunction-contempt power of the federal courts, and legitimizing economic due process.
56 Id. at 47-48 (citation omitted in original).

Id. at 48 (citation omitted in original).
William Howard Taft, Administration of CriminalLaw, Address to the Graduating
Class of Yale Law School (June 26, 1905), in WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, PRESENT DAY
PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES DELIVERED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 335-55
(1905).
59 HERBERT S. DUFFY, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
276-77 (1930).
57
58
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Though defeated in his re-election bid, Taft never wavered in his convictions and
never hesitated thereafter to rally his political allies and to take strong public stands
whenever necessary in opposition to judicial nominations that would dilute judicial
protection of private property.
Perhaps Taft's most widely publicized stand against a nomination he regarded
as dangerous to the Constitution was his dramatic opposition to Louis Brandeis's
nomination to the Court.6" The fact that Brandeis was nominally a Republican made
no difference to Taft, whose concerns about prospective judicial nominees were
always about their "real politics."' Brandeis's "real politics" were anathema to
Taft. He wrote to one of his aides that Brandeis's nomination represented "one of
the deepest wounds" that he had sustained "as an American and a lover of the
Constitution and a believer in progressive conservatism [that] when you consider
...that men were pressing [him] for the place, [it is ridiculous].'62 Taft saw
Brandeis as "a muckraker, an emotionalist for his own purposes, a socialist ... a
man who has certain high ideals in his imagination... of great tenacity of purpose
and, in my judgment, of much power for evil .... "63 Taft further complained that,
in nominating Brandeis, Wilson was "seeking to break down the guaranties [sic] of
the Constitution,"' and Taft predicted a "catastrophe... will come to this country
in having the Supreme Court reorganized by him."6' 5
To his brother, Taft wrote: "Iam deeply concerned to have such an insidious devil on
the Court... ." LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 214 (1983). Taft took the even more extreme step
of being signatory to a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, dated February 7, 1916,
stating: "[T]aking into view the reputation, character and professional career of Mr. Louis
D. Brandeis, he is not a fit person to be a member of the Supreme Court of the United
States." 2 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
60

SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1972, at 1226 (RoyM. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein
eds., 1975).
6,
See generally MASON, supra note 30.

Id. at 72 (citation omitted). There is also evidence that Roosevelt was against the
nomination of Brandeis as well. In a letter discussing the nomination, Senator Lodge, a wellknown Roosevelt confidant, wrote: "Idid not know that Mr. Brandeis, who has been in and
out of all political parties and of late has been a staunch Democrat, had such a hold on
Progressives. I know one Progressive who is pretty thoroughly against him, and that is
Theodore Roosevelt." A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 88
(1964). It should be noted that Todd later writes: "Despite a careful search, I was unable to
find any confirmation of Senator Lodge's statement that... Theodore Roosevelt was 'pretty
thoroughly against' Brandeis." Id. at 257.
63 Letter from William Howard Taft to Gus Karger (Jan. 31, 1916), in MASON, supra
note 30, at 72.
' Letter from William Howard Taft to Robert Winslow (Oct. 21, 1916), in 2 HENRY F.
PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 899 (1964).
65 Id. at 898.
62
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As president and later as President Harding's choice for chief justice, Taft
strived to ensure the appointments of justices who would wholeheartedly
"maint[ain] the Supreme Court as the bulwark to enforce the guaranty that no man
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law."" Harding's three
other appointees - George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Edward Sanford - were
all chosen because they were thought to be rigidly committed to securing the Court
in discharging this function. 7 Consequently, the Taft Court became the most
consistently conservative Court in philosophy and outcomes of any Court in the
twentieth century until a working majority of five Republican justices coalesced on
the Rehnquist Court.68
Though relatively brief in its duration, the Taft Court was distinctive for several
reasons. First, the Court struck down an unprecedented number of state and federal
economic regulations. As Robert McCloskey observed:
In the 1920-29 period the number of negative decisions under the
Fourteenth Amendment was almost double the number in the preceding
decade. These figures themselves suggest some change in the
constitutional climate, and the suggestion is confirmed by examination
of individual decisions. True, a great many economic statutes still
survived the judicial ordeal; prudent self-restraint was still an important
Court theme. But the temper of the times, signalized by conservative
Republican electoral triumphs and by the withering of the progressive
spirit in public policy, was infectious. The spread of the infection was
made somewhat more likely by the coming of men like Taft, Sutherland,
and Butler to the bench, for all of them were deeply convinced foes of
the welfare state. Now the judges were confident that they spoke for the

66 William Howard Taft, Mr. Wilson and the Campaign, 10 YALE L. REv. 19-20(1920),
in MASON, supra note 30, at 158.

Chief Justice Taft actively pursued the role of presidential advisor on judicial
selection. He explained to President Harding and his attorney general that "Ipresume I have
a legitimate right to possess the President of such information as I think useful, if he desires
to receive it." Letter from William Howard Taft to C.D. Hilles (Nov. 4, 1923), in MASON,
supranote 31, at 160. For his part, President Harding was insecure in his ability to nominate
justices and wrote to Taft: "Iam very glad to have you convey to me the information which
comes to you. I am anxious, of course, to make a thoroughly high-grade and satisfactory
nomination." Letter from Warren G. Harding to William Howard Taft (Nov. 2, 1922), in
MASON, supra note 30, at 161. Furthermore, Attorney General Daugherty wrote to Taft,
assuring him that Harding "would not approve anybody who was not approved by [the chief
justice]." Letter from H.W. Taft to William Howard Taft (Oct. 26, 1922), in MASON, supra
note 30, at 173.
68 See infra notes 252-66 and accompanying text.
67
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nation when they defended laissez faire.69
The second distinctive feature of the Taft Court's approach to due process and
equal protection claims was that it generally had a unified, if not coherent,
constitutional vision. The chief spokespersons and architects in expressing this
vision were Chief Justice Taft and Justice Sutherland. One of the few instances in
0 Much more often
which the two divided was in Adkins v. Children's Hospital."
than not, a majority of the Taft Court consistently took a formal approach to due
process and equal protection questions grounded in ajudicially cognizable, virtually
absolute fundamental right of property."
Third, the Taft Court's protection of due process rights extended, for the first
time in the Court's history, outside of the economic sphere. In Meyer v. Nebraska,7
most of the justices joined together to recognize a fundamental right to bar state or
local government from eliminating German in public schools or private schools
31
altogether. Two years later the Taft Court, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,
enjoined enforcement of a statute that would have made parents criminally liable
for sending their children to private schools.
The common link among Meyer, Pierce,and the economic due process cases
was the Taft Court's distrust of popular majorities. As early as 1913, Taft wrote
69 ROBERT G. McCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106 (Daniel J. Boorstin
ed., 2d ed. 1994).
70 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruledinpartby West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). Compare the opinion of Justice Sutherland for the Court, which included
extensive quotes from Lochner and concluded that "[s]ubsequent cases in this court have
been distinguished from that decision, but the principles therein stated have never been
disapproved," id. at 550, with the dissent filed by Chief Justice Taft in which he stated:

It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case [Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S.
426 (1917) (approving maximum hours legislation for factory workers)] and the
Lochner Case, and I have always supposed that the Lochner Case was thus
overruled sub silentio. Yet the opinion of the court herein in support of its
conclusion quotes from the opinion in the Lochner Case as one which has been
sometimes distinguished but never overruled. Certainly there was no attempt to
distinguish it in the Bunting Case.
Id. at 564 (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (holding a school district's decision
to send a student of Chinese descent to a colored school was not violative of the Equal
Protection Clause); Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (holding a
Nebraska law fixing the weights of loaves of bread arbitrary and unconstitutional); Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (holding an Arizona law prohibiting employers from
getting injunctions against striking employees violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
72 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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that radical reformers counted on "the willingness of an inflamed majority to
possess themselves of advantages over a minority, or the individual.' 4 In 1914,
Taft explained:
Those ofus who insist upon the preservation of constitutional limitations
upon the action of a majority... are convinced that we are the best
friends of popular government... [C]onstitutions are the self-imposed
restraints of a whole people upon a majority of them to secure sober
action and a respect for the rights of the minority."5
The fourth and distinctive feature of the Taft Court was its dissenters. On the
Taft Court, the dissenters were largely united in opposing economic due process;
however, it was not clear where they would draw the line precisely on the point
beyond which a legislature could not go in drafting social or economic legislation. 6
The sharp jurisprudential differences among the justices of the Taft Court
reflected increasing hostilities within the Court. The Chief Justice especially
distrusted dissent. When Brandeis dissented in Myers v. United States," for
example, Taft listed him among that "class of people that have no loyalty to the
[C]ourt and sacrifice almost everything to the gratification of their own publicity
and wish to stir up dissatisfaction with the decision of the [C]ourt, if they don't
happen to agree with it."'8 Though initially supportive of President Coolidge's
appointment of Harlan Fiske Stone to the Court in 1925, Taft grew to distrust Stone,
based on Stone's frequent alignments with Holmes and Brandeis. Taft equally
distrusted Herbert Hoover. Shortly before his retirement from the Court in 1930,
Taft expressed his concerns that "if a number of us died, Hoover would put in some
rather extreme destroyers of the Constitution."' 9
The discontent of the dissenters hardly was confined to the pages of the
Supreme Court Reports. The Taft Court had more than its fair share of public
critics. For instance, in 1921, The New Republic published an unsigned editorial
14

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE,

AND ITS PERILs 233 (1913), in MASON, supra note 30, at 57.
15 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUSTACT ANDTHE SUPREME COURT (1914), in
MASON, supra note 30, at 60.
76 For example, Stone split with Brandeis and Holmes and joined the "conservative"
majority in the major First Amendment cases of the day: Whitney v. California,274 U.S.
357 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); and Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
77 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding a congressional act requiring the consent of the Senate
to remove various classes of postmasters violative of Article II of the Constitution).
78 Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Oct. 27, 1926), in HENRY F.
PRINGLE, 2 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 1025 (1939) (citation omitted).
79 MASON, supra note 30, at 70.
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that lamented "the present temporary triumph of reaction."" ° The author other than Felix Frankfurter - continued:

none

Labor is cowed, liberalism is confused, and the country's thinking
generally is done in the storm cellar .... But... [c]ases involving the
social control allowed the states under the [Flourteenth [A]mendment,
or the exercise of federal power for police purposes... will soon again
call forth a clash of differing conceptions of policy and of the proper
scope of the Court's ultimate veto power .... 81
Similarly, in 1922, a despairing Woodrow Wilson pleaded with Justice John H.
Clark not to retire, citing the menace of Taft's conservative activism. He wrote:
Like thousands of other liberals throughout the country, I have been
counting on the influence of you and Justice Brandeis to restrain the
Court in some measure from the extreme reactionary course which it
seems inclined to follow .... The most obvious and immediate danger
to which we are exposed is that the courts will more and more outrage
the people's sense of justice and cause a revulsion against judicial
authority which may seriously disturb the equilibrium of our institutions,
and I can see nothing which can save us from this danger if the Supreme
Court is to repudiate liberal courses of thought and action. 2
In 1924, a North Dakota judge expressed what many liberals of the times had been
thinking when he suggested: "It is ourjudges who formulate our public policies and
our basic law .... We are governed by our judges and not by our legislatures." 3
In 1930, Frankfurter no longer remained anonymous in criticizing the Court,
though his criticisms had become more intense. He wrote:
Since 1920, the Court has invalidated more legislation than in [the] fifty
years preceding. Views that were antiquated twenty-five years ago have
been resurrected in decisions nullifying minimum wage laws for women
in industry, a standard-weight bread law to protect buyers from short
weights and honest bakers from unfair competition, a law fixing the
resale of the price of theater tickets by scalpers, laws controlling the
exploitation of the unemployed by employment agencies and many tax

80 Mr. ChiefJustice Taft, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 27, 1921, at 230.
sI Id.
82 MASON, supra note 30, at 165 (citation omitted in original).
83

ANDREW A. BRUCE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE 6, 8 (1924).
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laws.8
For Frankfurter, this was a disastrous turn of events, particularly because the sheer
number of laws struck down did not fully tell the tale of the Taft Court. He
explained:
[fin the first place, all laws are not of the same importance. Secondly,
a single decision may decide the fate of a great body of legislation...
Moreover, the discouragement of legislative efforts through a
particular adverse decision and the general weakening of the sense of
legislative responsibility are destructive influences not measurable by
statistics.8 5
Despite the derision, Chief Justice Taft staunchly defended the Court's
conservative activism throughout his tenure. In 1922, he explained: "It is better to
endure wrongs than to effect disastrous changes in which the proposed remedy may
be worse than the evil."86 By the end of his tenure, as his health was failing, he
confessed to his son that "[t]he truth is that Hoover is a Progressive, just as Stone
' Though Taft never lived to see
is, and just as Brandeis is and just as Holmes is."87
it, his worst fears were about to be realized.
II. THE HUGHES COURT, 1930-41
The Hughes Court was a transitional court. It stands roughly in the middle not just chronologically, but also in terms of judicial philosophy and outcomes between the Taft Court's persistent, formalistic defense of property rights and the
Stone and Vinson Courts' absolute deference to economic regulations. The series
of cases in which this transition unfolded is as well documented and analyzed as
any in American constitutional history.
The transition was made possible by a number of forces, one of the most
underrated having been the pressure applied to President Hoover to forego
appointing conservative ideologues like Taft or Sutherland to the Court. The
clearest illustration of the success of this pressure is the fact that Hoover was the
first president in the twentieth century to have had a Supreme Court nominee
rejected by the Senate. Though Hoover's nominee John Parker, a Fourth Circuit
Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme Court Molding the Constitution,
CURRENT HISTORY, May 1930, at 239.
84

85 Id.

6 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, LIBERTY UNDER LAW 21 (1921).

87

967.

Letter from W.H. Taft to Horace Taft (Dec. 1, 1929), in PRINGLE, supra note 78, at
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judge, was generally well-regarded by the legal community, liberal interest groups
organized a campaign against him. They helped to forge fatal opposition against
the nomination by a coalition of Democrats and progressive Republicans." At the
' he
time, Parker's defeat was "generally interpreted as a blow at conservatism;"89
was, as Harlan Fiske Stone observed, a "victim of the circumstances [of his
nomination] .. . ."I9 The circumstances in question were the growing political
discontent with aggressive judicial protection of private property rights at the
expense of economic reform.
Even when the Senate accepted Hoover's Supreme Court nominees, it exacted
a price. After Parker's rejection, President Hoover nominated Owen Roberts
largely because he knew senators from both parties would agree on Roberts, who
had served with distinction as a special prosecutor investigating some of the
scandals of the Harding Administration. Later, in 1932, when Hoover's power
(even within his own party) was at its lowest, Senate leaders warned Hoover that
the only acceptable nomination he could make to replace the retiring Justice Holmes
was Benjamin Cardozo. 9' Hoover resisted because Cardozo's well-publicized
opposition to the Taft Court's activism and critiques of economic due process
clearly marked him as a "liberal. 92 Hoover relented and appointed Cardozo to the
Court.
Hoover's nomination of Charles Evans Hughes as chief justice ran into nearly
as much flak as his similarly-timed nomination of John Parker as an associate
justice. Because of the strong support of both of New York's senators, Hughes's
nomination avoided serious trouble. Yet, its success was not due to the absence of
strong-willed opposition. After initially signaling he would support the Hughes
nomination, Senator George Norris, a prominent progressive Republican, led the
opposition to Hughes. He explained that, inter alia, "[we] have reached a time in
our history when the power and influence of monopoly and organized wealth are
reaching into every governmental activity ....Perhaps... it is not far amiss to say
that no man in public life so exemplifies the influence of powerful combinations in
' Robert La Follette, another
the political and financial world as does Mr. Hughes."93
prominent progressive Republican, warned that in expressing opinions on Hughes's
nominations, senators "are filling the jury box which ultimately will decide the
In 1930, the Republican-controlled Senate rejected Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker's
nomination as an associate justice by a vote of 41-39.
89 ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 300 (1956)
88

[hereinafter, MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE].

o Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to His Sons, Apr. 18, Apr. 30, 1930, in MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 300 (internal quotations omitted).
9' See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTrrUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 173-74 (2000).
92 See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOzO 465-67 (1998).
9372 CONG. REc. 3373 (1930), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 297.
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issue between organized greed and the rights of the masses of this country. If that
'
be the situation, the Court is responsible for it."94
Echoing the views of many
senators, Senator Carter Glass reviewed some of Hughes's opinions from his tenure
as an associatejustice to illustrate how "the Supreme Court in recent years has gone
far afield from its original function and has constituted itself a court in economics
and in the determination of social questions rather than the interpretation of statutes
passed with reference to the Constitution itself."' According to Mason, Hughes's
opponents pointed out that the Court had become "a great political body, appointed
very often through political influence, passing on political questions, fixing policies
for the people, legislating when they should leave that to Congress."9' 6 Senator
Norris stated the problem directly: The Court had become "another legislative body
[consisting] of nine men; and they are more powerful than all the other[ legislative
bodies] put together."97 Hughes, like Parker, was opposed less for anything he had
done wrong, but rather because his appointment would reinforce, in Senator
Clarence Dill's estimation:
[A] judicial system of law that is fast bringing economic slavery in this
country .... If the system ofjudicial law that is being written in defiance
of state legislation and of congressional legislation is continued,... there
is no human power in America that can keep the Supreme Court from
becoming a political issue, nationwide, in the not far-distant future. 98
Though the Senate ultimately confirmed Hughes 52-26, with eighteen senators
abstaining, many senators believed their opposition had effectively signaled to
President Hoover and the new chief justice both the extent of the senators' power
and displeasure with the direction of the Court.
By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt entered office, the hard-core opposition of
the Court to economic reform had already begun to wither. By 1941, he had made
four appointments, and there were no Republican appointees, with the sole
exception of Harlan Fiske Stone, left on the Court. All of the nine justices,
including Stone, shared a deep-seated hostility to economic due process and
commitment to preserving the New Deal against constitutional attack. Some of the
New Deal liberals whom Roosevelt appointed to the Court, particularly William 0.
Douglas, were legal realists who were dedicated as judges to exposing the politics
behind the formalisms of the Taft Court, to being enlightened by the social sciences,

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1930, in MASON, supra note 90, at 298.
95 72 CONG. REc. 3553 (1930), in MASON, HARLAN FiSKE STONE, supranote 89, at 298.
94

supra note 90, at 299.
72 CONG. REC. 3449, 3516, 3566 (1930), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra
note 89, at 299.
9' 72 CONG. REC. 3642 (1930), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supranote 89, at 299.
96 MASON,
97
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to being more candid about their reasoning, and "to go[ing] with the unconscious
flow of practice-based intuition.""
The Court's increasing acceptance of social legislation has dominated narratives
on the Court during the period from 1930 to 1941.'° The preoccupation with

explaining both the significance and causes for this acceptance has sometimes come
at the expense of recognizing the significance of at least two other developments
that, together with the ultimate acceptance of the constitutional foundations for the
New Deal, provided the fodder for public commentary on the Court during this
period. The first of these was a series of decisions broadly interpreting the scope
of various Bill of Rights claims that foreshadowed the Court's future agenda.'
This series of decisions became important because, in time, it helped to drive a
wedge to divide the New Deal liberals, who increasingly disagreed over the
appropriate level of judicial deference regarding non-economic interests.
As this series of decisions unfolded, public discourse reflected the political
divide over the Court. For example, The New York Times hailed the Court's
decision in Powell v. Alabama"°2 as a healing decision in that it "ought to abate the
rancor of extreme radicals while confirming the faith of the American people in the
soundness of their institutions and especially the integrity of the courts."'0 3 The far
left disagreed, however, as the Communist Party position was that: "A careful
reading of the official decision shows that the Supreme Court has taken great care
to instruct the Alabama authorities how 'properly' to carry through such lynch
schemes and bolster their discredited 'judicial' institutions."'04

" Thomas Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 501 (1996)
(reviewing NEILDUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1996)). Grey provides
a wonderful overview of the development of American legal thought in the twentieth
century. For a more detailed and equally excellent overview, see LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1991).

"0Even before the Parrishcase in 1937, it became clear that the laissezfaire majority
of the 1920s had become a minority. More often than not, Hughes and Roberts tended to be
in the majority on questions regarding the constitutionality of social legislation. As Barry
Cushman notes, "it is ...safe to say that by 1937 the prohibition against minimum wage
legislation was pretty close to all that was left of economic substantive due process." Barry
Cushman, Lost Fidelities,41 WM. &MARY L. REv. 95, 104 (1999).
oI See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (holding freedom of assembly to
be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
(holding that due process requires states to supply indigent defendants with counsel); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding freedom of the press to be incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
102 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
103 N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 8, in DAN T. CARTER, ScoTrSBoRo: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH
104N.Y.

163 (1969).

DAILY WORKER, Nov. 8, 1932, at 8, in DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 163 (1969).
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This debate was often overshadowed, however, by the residual vitriol of the
conflict over economic substantive due process. A good example of the enmity
marking this conflict was the extraordinary dissent of Justice McReynolds in The
Gold Clause Cases."' Because the dissent was too scathing to be included in the
official record, McReynolds published it in The Wall Street Journal. In his
(characteristically) surly view:
It is impossible to estimate the result of what has been done this day. The
Constitution as many of us have understood it, the Constitution that has
meant so much, has gone. The guarantees which men and women
heretofore have supposed protected them against arbitrary action have been
swept away. The powers of Congress have been enlarged to such an extent
that no man can forsee their limitations. We stand today stripped of the
fundamental guarantees we heretofore supposed stood between us and
arbitrary action .... We protest .... Shame and humiliation are upon
06

US.1

President Roosevelt strongly expressed the opposing point of view in his Courtpacking speech. He stated:
[S]ince the rise of the modem movement for social and economic progress
through legislation, the Court has more and more often and more and more
boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed by the Congress and State
Legislatures ....The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as
a policy-making body .... We have, therefore, reached the point as a
Nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court
07
and the Court from itself.
Though Chief Justice Hughes's opposition to the Court-packing plan pleased
many conservatives, his seemingly inconsistent jurisprudence persistently
confounded conservatives and liberals alike. In a retrospective published near the
time of his retirement, The New Republiccommented that "[o]n questions involving
social policy, it was always more difficult to predict where Hughes would stand

The Gold Clause Cases were Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v.
UnitedStates, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Norman v. Baltimoreand Ohio RailroadCo., 294 U.S.
240 (1935).
'06 WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1935, reprintedin ROBERT MAYER, 7 THE SUPREME COURT IN
05

AMERICAN LIFE: THE COURTANDTHE AMERICAN CRISES 1930-1952, at 127, 128-31(1987).
'07 RadioBroadcast(Mar. 9, 1937), reprintedin DAviDM. O'BRIEN, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND

PoLmcs 65-66 (4th ed. 2000).
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than where other members of the Court would be found."' ' Even members of the
Court noted the wandering path of the Court. In 1936, Justice Stone wrote to thenProfessor Felix Frankfurter:

I think there has never been a time in the history of the Court when there
has been so little intelligible, recognizable pattern in its judicial
performance as in the last few years ....
The worst of it is that the one
[Hughes] you find most difficult to understand is the one chiefly
responsible. 9

Chief Justice Hughes dismissed such criticism on the ground that thejurisprudential
labels on which it rested were misleading and ultimately inapplicable to him:
A young student wrote me the other day to ask whether I regarded
myself as "liberal" or"conservative." I answered that these labels do not
interest me. I know of no accepted criterion.... Such characterizations
are not infrequently used to foster prejudices and they serve as a very
poor substitute for intelligent criticism. A judge who does his work in
an objective spirit, as a judge should, will address himself
conscientiously to each case, and will not trouble himselfabout labels.110
By 1940, however, it was widely acknowledged that the debates on the Court
regarding the legitimacy of business regulations had been settled and that a "new
constitutionalism" had taken hold on the Court. Some commentators condemned
this "new constitutionalism" on the ground that in settling the debates "[t]he Court
has created doctrine, which stands in the way of its own lapse into legalism.""'
The second development glossed over in many commentaries on the Hughes
Court relates to the status of conservative critics of the New Deal. Legal scholars
focus so much on the development of New Deal liberalism that they often overlook
what conservative politicians and commentators were arguing in the same period.
Accounts of the revolution of 1937 usually gloss over conservatives, as ifthey were
increasingly silent in this period. Yet conservatives could be heard not just on the
108THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 9, 1941, in ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM

TAFT TO WARREN 105 (1958) [hereinafter MASON, THE SUPREME COURT].
'01Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone
SUPREME COURT, supra note 108, at

to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 17, 1936), in MASON, THE
106.

' Address to the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, 1932, in THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHICALNOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 300 (David J. Danelski & Joseph

S. Tulchin eds., 1973).
. Walton Hamilton & George Brock, The Supreme Court Today, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 5, 1940, in WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 112 (1970).
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Court (for example, in Justice Sutherland's opinions), but also in strident public
criticisms of New Deal legislation," 2 the apparent switch on the Hughes Court that
brought about enduring support for New Deal legislation," 3 Roosevelt's Court
appointments," 4 and of course Roosevelt's Court-packing plan."' The obvious
problem for conservative leaders on the national stage was in wresting control of
both the White House and the Congress from Democrats, but without threatening
the dismantlement of relatively popular, even if somewhat ineffective, regulatory
measures designed to ameliorate economic hardships produced in part by
technological advancements." 6 The lack of political success left conservatives
disgruntled and in some disarray. For conservatives, the 1930s were "[u]ncongenial
years of worker's utopias, New Orders, and marching feet abroad; Blue Eagles, the
WPA, and increasing regulation of the economy at home.""' 7
V. THE STONE AND VINSON COURTS, 1941-1953
By the time President Roosevelt elevated Associate Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
to the chief justiceship in 1941, the Supreme Court and its agenda were very
different from what they had been only a decade before. By 1941, the once-intense
controversies over property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
112 For

example, in a pamphlet dated May 31, 1935, the American Liberty League

(founded by conservative businessmen) thundered:
The New Deal is nothing more or less than an effort sponsored by inexperienced
sentimentalists and demagogues to take away from the thrifty what the thrifty and
their ancestors have accumulated, or may accumulate, and give it to others who
have not earned it, or whose ancestors haven't earned it for them, and who never
would have earned it and never will earn it, and thus indirectly to destroy the
incentive for all future accumulation. Such a purpose is in defiance of all the tenets
upon which our civilization has been founded.
JOHN MAJOR, THE NEW DEAL 80 (1967) (quoting Ralph Shaw, The New Deal: Its Unsound
Theories and IrreconcilablePolicies 13 (1935)). Indeed, opposition to Roosevelt became
such a fixation of that traditional bastion of conservatism, the upper class, that HARPER'S
magazine noted in May 1936 that "fanatical hatred of the President... today obsesses
thousands of men and women among the upper class." They HateRoosevelt, HARPER'S, May
1936, at 634, in MAJOR, supra,at 100. The author noted also that, "the phenomenon... goes
well beyond objection to policies or programs." Id.
"I Id. at 176.
"4

See, e.g., WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 185-87 (1995)

(discussing conservatives' reactions, inter alia, to Black's nomination in 1937).
See id. at 85, 107, 135, 139, 158.
See DAVID KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR 278-86 (1999.).
"17 GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT INAMERICA SINCE

"

116

1945, at 1 (1996).
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over the scope of enumerated federal powers had been fully settled. "8 Instead, the
Court devoted significant attention to a number of troublesome constitutional issues
brought about by the Second World War." 9 Moreover, it fragmented over the
question of heightened scrutiny of measures affecting "specific" constitutional
prohibitions, political processes, and insular minorities that the chief justice had
initially raised as an associate justice in his fourth footnote in United States v.
CaroleneProducts Co. 2' While to a substantial extent Stone's view had already
prevailed,' 2 ' the battle was not to be fully won until Felix Frankfurter retired from
the Court in 1962."' In the meantime, as David Currie has observed, "[a]s leading
spokesmen for the competing views [on judicial restraint], Justices Black and
Frankfurter, like Field and Miller three-quarters of a century before, squared off in
1946 for another decade and a half of intense controversy over the most
fundamental questions of judicial authority."'2 3
Neither Stone's replacement as chiefjustice in 1946 (Fred Vinson), nor any of
Truman's other three appointees - Sherman Minton, Tom Clark, and Harold
Burton - played major roles in this debate. Unlike every other post-World War
II president, Truman chose Supreme Court nominees based on his personal
experiences with them and not on specific criteria designed to elicit information
about their likely judicial philosophies. 24 He appointed justices who were
sympathetic to and supportive of the New Deal, but this was largely because he was
choosing from a pool of politicians with whom he felt personally and ideologically
comfortable. The pool obviously consisted of people who had largely gained their
See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 669 (1941) (striking down
bans on so-called "yellow-dog" contracts); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941)
(refusing to invalidate state statute on economic due process grounds); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (194 1) (upholding federal minimum wage for production workers and
explicitly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251 (1918)); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (defining federal power to regulate commerce),
1 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (944) (upholding exclusion of
Japanese Americans from coastal zones and, in effect, their internment); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfews on Japanese Americans); Exparte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding jurisdiction of a special military tribunal over German
saboteurs).
120 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
121 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
121 See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
118

123

DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND

CENTURY 1888-1986, at 333 (1990) (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The history structure of this clash is extensively chronicled
in JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FEuX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES INMODERN AMERICA (1989). See also infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
124 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERALJUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 68-78 (1997).
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political experience and proven their loyalty to Truman in political contests over the
New Deal and its legacy.'2 Consequently, Truman's appointees did not share any
unified philosophy regarding the cutting constitutional issues of the day. They were
widely regarded as "liberals" not so much because of a common judicial
philosophy, but because of their shared political experiences prior to their
appointments to the Court, including of course their support for Roosevelt's New
Deal regime.
Truman's appointments did not ease tensions within the Court, even though by
1946 the Court consisted entirely of Democratic appointees. Fully aware of this
discord during his chiefjusticeship, Stone wrote in 1945:
My more conservative brethren in the old days enacted their own
economic prejudice into law. What they did placed in jeopardy a great
and useful institution of government. The pendulum has now swung to
the other extreme, and history is repeating itself. The Court is now in as
much danger of becoming a legislative and Constitution-making body,
enacting into law its own predilections, as it was then. The only
difference is that now the interpretations of statutes whether "overconservative" or "over-liberal" can be corrected by Congress. 2 6
For the most part, Truman's appointees joined the more restrained of their senior
colleagues to slow down the expansion of civil liberties after the departures of
Stone and Roberts at the end of the Second World War and the premature deaths of
Murphy and Rutledge.127 Nevertheless, in this period the Court sanctioned the first
125

Id.

,26 Letter from C.J. Stone to Irving Brant (Aug. 25, 1945), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE
STONE, supra note 89, at 779. Stone often confided in Brant, who was a prominent liberal
commentator in the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. Brant shared many of these
communications with Stone's eminent biographer, Alpheus T. Mason. According to Mason:

Brant insist[ed] that [Stone] wished, above all, to be known as a 'liberal,' and his
prerogative in assigning opinions, in speaking for the Court himself whenever he
was with the majority, or passing the task along to [an] associate[], made this quite
easy. In a perceptive article Brant tells how this self-portrait was executed. (See
Irving Brant, "How Liberal IsJustice Hughes," The New Republic, July 21 and July
28, 1937.)
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supranote 89, at 459-60 (footnote at bottom of page).
127 Robert McCloskey notes: "Arithmetic reckonings alone illustrate the contrast. The
proportion of decisions favorable to the individual never in any term of the Stone Court

dropped below 50 percent; there was only one term of the Vinson Court (1947) in which the
percentage of favorable decisions rose above fifty." ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT 57 (1972) (emphasis in original).
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great wave of expansions in civil rights outside of the realm of economic due
process, 28 and it advanced the process of incorporation.2 9
Public criticism ofthe Court in the mid- 1940s focused on the increasing discord
among the justices, the Court's disdain for following or respecting precedent, and
the Court's penchant for making, rather than merely interpreting, the law. For
instance, an editorial in The New York Times charged that the "majority of the new
appointees came to the Court... apparently under the theory that their function was
not so much to know and apply the law as it stands, or in case of doubt to interpret
it objectively, but to apply a new 'social philosophy' in their decisions."' 3 ° In
reaction to the Underwriters' case,' The New York Times commented in 1944,
"[i]ts practical effect is the same as if Congress had just passed a sweeping new
piece of legislation. Once more the Supreme Court has acted, in effect, like a third
legislative house."' 3' The Houston Post was even more critical. "When the United
States Supreme Court doffs its black robes Monday," it reported in October 1944,
"it will go with less popular admiration and respect than any previous Supreme
Court has enjoyed within the memory of living men. In this body of jurists the
majesty and dignity and the prestige of the nation's highest tribunal has hit an alltime low.' 3'
The American Bar Association condemned the Stone Court's
tendency to ignore precedent, which it called "The New Guesspotism," and warned
that the Constitution had again become "a mere thing of wax in the hands of the
judiciary."' 134 Harvard Law School Professor Thomas Reed Powell asked: "Who
can tell what other landmarks will be similarly obliterated? Where shall confidence
13
be placed?"' "
12 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (outlawing white-only primaries);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (outlawing exclusion of aliens
from commercial fishing); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (setting limits on
indirect governmental interference with First Amendment rights); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (outlawing judicial enforcement of racial covenants).
129See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating right against
unreasonable searches and seizures); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating the
right to a public trial); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the
separation of church and state).
130 MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 625 (citation omitted).
"' United States v. Southeastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
131MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 624 (citation omitted in original).
'3
Id. at 624 (citation omitted in original).
13430 A.B.A. J. 485 (Sept. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at
624; Frank W. Grinnell, 30 A.B.A. J. 507 (Sept. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE,
supra note 89, at 624; J.W. Henderson, 30 A.B.A. J.597 (Nov. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN
FISKE STONE, supranote 89, at 624; C. Perry Patterson, Jefferson and JudicialReview, 30

A.B.A. J.443 (Aug. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 624.

13'Thomas Reed Powell, Our High Court Analyses, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 18,
1944, in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supranote 89, at 624-25.
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The Court, however, did have its defenders. For instance, prominent liberal
commentator Walton Hamilton maintained the Court was dealing in good faith with
difficult issues. He asked rhetorically why "the Court, an organ of high policy in
a society moving rapidly to a 'new social order,' [should not] reflect differences
widespread among the people?"' 36 He further suggested that:
If often its conduct has not been in accord with our angelic notions,..
. the reason is that the public is let in on the performance. I wonder if
any other agency of state... could under a like scrutiny exhibit either
more brotherly restraint or a more conscientious regard for the general
welfare. 37
"'
Looking back on the Stone Court's performance during the Second World War,
Hamilton declared:
Neither the law nor the Court is to be regimented so long as Stone sits...
. In less than a decade the Court has been transformed. It has ceased to be
a super-legislature; it stands today, more firmly than any other agency of
a State, in the great American tradition.
Max Lerner, another prominent academic, agreed: "It is good to have Justices on
the Supreme Court who pretend to no Olympian infallibility and who can stick their
necks out of their enfolding robes."' 39 Legal scholar Kenneth Sears was even more
praiseworthy of the Stone Court: "Never in the history of the Supreme Court of the
United States has the Bill of Rights been more frequently or more ardently
supported, and never have the privileges of the poor and the weak and of the
minorities of race, color, and religion been more clearly asserted.""
Chief Justice Stone was extremely sensitive to the public critiques, and he even
agreed with some of them.' 4' According to Stone's biographer Alpheus T. Mason,
Stone believed this "'[l]iberalism' of the right sort would not lead judges to enact
Walton Hamilton, The Supreme Court Today - PartI: Nine IndependentMen, THE
NATION, Aug. 12, 1944, in MASON, supranote 90, at 625; Walton Hamilton, PartII: Nine
136

Men, One Law, THE NATION, Aug. 19, 1944, in MASON,HAR.AN FISKE STONE, supra note

89, at 625.
117 MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supranote 89, at 798.
138 Id.
131

Id. (citation omitted).

Kenneth C. Sears, The Supreme Court and the New Deal - An Answer to Texas, 12
U. CHI. L. REv. 140, 159 (1945), in MASON, HARLAN FiSKE STONE, supra note 89, at 798.
'41
See MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 782-83 (quoting extensively
140

Stone's approval of a leading scholar's critical analysis of the Court's work published in
1945).
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their own economic preferences into law."' 42 Stone chided liberal critic Irving
Brant:
Back of your criticism of the 5 to 4 decisions... is your recognition that
Congress will not 'correct' them. It will not, because, as I believe, it never
intended any other result than that which the Court reached. If that is so the
Court has done its sworn duty. Are you seeking the appointment ofjudges
who will do more? 43
In September 1945, Stone expressed to Thomas Reed Powell his concerns about the
likely liberal activism of some of his colleagues:
The time was when I thought you had worked yourself out of a job[,]...
because the pendulum had swung from the extreme right, where it seemed
to be when I came on the Court, much nearer the golden mean. Now that
the pendulum seems to be swinging to the other extreme, I feel sure you
will have plenty to write about.'"4
Less than a year later, Stone's sudden death gave President Truman the
4
opportunity to appoint his friend and political ally Fred Vinson as chief justice.
The appointment of Vinson, however, did not lessen either the discord within the
Court or its denunciations in political fora. A striking example is to be found in the
consistently critical public statements of Senator James Eastland of Mississippi. In
1946, he warned:
[A] number of men who now sit upon the Court do not have the proper
legal background, judicial temperament, or the ability to sit upon the
world's greatest legal tribunal and to decide fundamental questions upon
which the very system of our Government, as we know it, depends....
[S]ome students of government have expressed the opinion that these men
were appointed because of their economic and social ideologies and their
zest for crusading, rather than their judicial knowledge and legal acumen.
... We find ourselves with a Court, which often is charged with being the
142 Id. at 779.
"41 Letter from

Harlan Fiske Stone to Irving Brant (Aug. 25, 1945), in MASON, HARLAN
FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 779.
'"

Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Thomas Reed Powell (Nov. 8, 1945), in MASON,

HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 780 (citation omitted).
145 Alpheus T. Mason closed his monumental biography of Stone on the same theme as
many of the eulogies written at the time of Stone's death: "Little minds, trying to compress

his meaning within the handy labels of 'conservative' or 'liberal,' had been confounded."
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 809.
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weakest in the history of the Republic, a Court which now is engaged in
changing the fundamental law of the United States and overruling the
considered opinions of their great and illustrious predecessors. ... The

inferior courts and the people of this country do not know what the law is
or what their rights are, because of the confusion created by the present
Supreme Court.'46
Public attacks on the Court often included charges of complicity with Communist
subversion by the "liberal" justices and were peppered with thinly veiled racism.
For example, Representative Rankin of Mississippi angrily suggested as much in
his appraisal of the Vinson Court's decisions of the 1948 term:
[T]here must have been a celebration in Moscow last night; for the
Communists won their greatest victory in the Supreme Court of the
United States on yesterday, when that once august body proceeded to
destroy the value of property owned by tens of thousands of loyal
Americans ...by their anti-covenants decision.... That tribunal [also]
recently upheld the atheists ...[and] attempted, by judicial fiat, to
redraw the boundary lines of every state .... Which all adds up to the

fact that white Christian Americans seem to have no rights left which the
present Supreme Court feels bound to respect. 47
Similarly, Representative Mason of Illinois introduced into the Congressional
Record an editorial from the ChicagoDaily Tribune in July 1949 that lambasted the
Vinson Court's decision in Christoffel v. United States." The article stated that
"[lt was pretty evident in the Christoffel case that a left wing majority of the
Supreme Court decided that it wanted to let Christoffel off, and having reached that
decision, looked around for some law to make the decision look right.' 49
In 1951, Justice Roberts, then retired from the Court, openly castigated the
Vinson Court for:
[S]urrender[ing] the role the Constitution was intended to confer on it.
Vox populi vox Dei was not the theory on which the charter was drawn.
The sharp divisions of powers intended has become blurred.... It seems
obvious that doctrines announced as corollaries to express grants of
power to the Congress have more and more circumscribed the pristine
92 CONG. REc. 7,065 (1946) (statement of Sen. Eastland).
CONG. REC. 5,256-57 (1948) (statement of Rep. Rankin).
141 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
149 95 CONG. REc. at A4693 (1949) (statement of Rep. Mason) (quoting Editorial, The
Supreme Court Outsmarts Itself, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 18, 1949).
'4
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powers of the states, which were intended to be reserved to them by the
Constitution. 50
Many liberals were not any more satisfied with the Vinson Court than its
conservative critics. Some liberals, both on and off the Court, thought the Court
was becoming too activist in its pursuit of liberal ideals."' Justice Frankfurter, in
particular, found himself in an awkward position as the Court's chief advocate of
judicial restraint. Praised by liberals for his staunch defense ofjudicial restraint in
the 1930s and early 1940s, he was upset to find that, in the late 1940s and early
1950s, they denounced him:
Now, when he advocated judicial restraint, he was attacked by those
very liberals [who had once praised him.] In his earlier years, pillars of
the legal community like Henry Stimson, Emory Buckner, and Charles
Burlingham praised him. Now, they were either dead or silent.... [ln
the Truman years, there was little White House contact. Frankfurter had
never believed he was "the single most influential man" in Washington
but sometimes he had enjoyed the notoriety. Now there was no more
notoriety; he was only one of nine, and one under increasing criticism
52
from those once his friends."
In 1951, Judge Learned Hand expressed his own dwindling confidence in the
Vinson Court's ability to stay on the course that Chief Justice Stone had tried to
steer: "[Stone] steered a course at times very difficult and he had the right absolutely right - measure of a Court's limitation on constitutional questions,
which appears to be in danger of being lost again.'1' s3
Others thought the Court was not going far enough. Looking back on the
Vinson Court, Yale Law School Professor Fred Rodell harshly criticized its loyalty
jurisprudence." 4 In his opinion,
15o OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTrrUTION

95 (1951).

"' A striking example of this phenomenon is Justice Frankfurter's characterization of
Justice Hugo Black as "essentially lawless" in a letter to Learned Hand regarding denial of

certiorari in United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.denied,347 U.S.

913 (1954), a case that had prompted an impassioned dissent from Hand while on the
Second Circuit. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Mar. 3, 1954); GUNTHER,
supra note 47, at 623.
152 LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 456 (1984).
113

Letter from Learned Hand to Alpheus T. Mason (Aug. 22, 1951), in MASON, HARLAN

FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 777 (citation omitted).
14 The loyalty cases arose in the 1950s in response to legislation passed to combat the
perceived influence of subversives (read Communists) in many facets of American life. See,
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[T]he tragedy.., is that the Supreme Court's majority, with the most
magnificent opportunity ever granted so small a group to show the world
the profound difference between the humanity of a democracy and the
brutality of a dictatorship, so miserably failed; that the Court - except
in the Negro cases - while purporting to fight a foreign tyranny,
actually aped it.'
Similarly, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called for greater liberal judicial activism. In
1947, he wrote that "[c]onservative majorities in past Courts have always legislated
in the interests of the business community ... ."156 So, Schlesinger wondered,
"Why should a liberal majority tie its hands by a policy of self-denial?"' 7 The
Court's course after Chief Justice Vinson's death five years later in 1952 would
provide a dramatic answer to this question.

VI. THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969
The conventional wisdom in academia is that the Warren Court went through
two phases of decision-making.' The pivotal event that separates these periods
was the retirement of Felix Frankfurter from the Court in 1962. President Kennedy
appointed Arthur Goldberg to the seat vacated by Frankfurter, an appointment that
transformed an "activist minority" (then consisting of Black, Douglas, Warren, and
Brennan) 59 into a majority. Justice Frankfurter had been in the vanguard of the
assault on racial injustice (notably Brown and its progeny) 16' and religious
establishment, 6' but he had lost a few important battles for "judicial restraint" in
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the Smith Act under which
members of the Communist Party had been jailed for conspiring to organize a society to
advocate violently overthrowing the U.S. government); Am. Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding legislation conditioning union access to the NLRB
on loyalty oaths); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding the
Hatch Act provisions limiting permissible political activity of civil service employees).
155 FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 304 (1955).
156 Arthur

Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1947, FoRTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 73.

157 Id.

'58 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 123, at 375.
159 Id.
160 Gomillion

v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); New Orleans City Park Improvement

Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of

Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459-559 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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other fields. 162 At the time of Frankfurter's retirement, the Warren Court had yet
to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights, as it would over its remaining seven years,
and through incorporation direct the widespread reformation of state criminal
procedures. 63 After Frankfurter's departure,'" the Warren Court, building on
precedents from the late 1930s and 1940s, expanded to unprecedented degrees the
scope of equal protection,'65 free speech,'66 and criminal procedure guarantees.' 67
However one characterizes the Warren Court's evolution,'" the political
discontent it generated was intense. 69 The fact that the Court generated such
discontent does not mean that it was running counter to prevailing social and
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
For an overview of the development and application of the selective incorporation
doctrine, see Jerold Israel, Selective IncorporationRevisited, 71 Geo. L.J. 253 (1982).
164 Another account of the Warren Court's activism focuses on its impact on processbased jurisprudence, which posited, inter alia, that the rule of law was essential to the
preservation of liberal democracy. See Grey, supranote 99, at 504-05. The Warren Court's
activism divided the:
'62

13

[p]rocess jurists .... Most of them followed Felix Frankfurter in rejecting liberal
activism as simply the mirror image of the conservative activism of the old Court,
equally partisan and no more consistent with the conception of a nonpolitical
judiciary dedicated to upholding the rule of law. A minority of Process thinkers
took up [Stone's] suggestion... that the rule of law in a democracy required active
judicial correction of the tendency of the majoritarian political system to
undervalue the interests of minorities, dissenters, and the downtrodden. This
division presaged a more far-reaching break-up: by the late 1960s, the remarkable
sway that the Process Jurisprudence had held over postwar American legal thought
was about to come to an end.
Id.

See, e.g., Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
166 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968); Street v. New York,
391 U.S. 367 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
167 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
16' For a description of the Warren Court in three phases, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
165

WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLmCS 122-23, 485-501 (2000).
169

For sympathetic accounts of the Warren Court, see, e.g., MORTON J. HoRwITz, THE

WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998), POWE, supra note 169, LOuiS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996), and J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a
DemocraticSociety - JudicialActivism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968). For

critical assessments of the Warren Court by prominent conservatives, see RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1977), and PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT
(1970).
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political mores. Instead, it likely means that over the Warren Court's lifespan, the
opposition intensified, eventually culminating in the election of Richard M. Nixon
to the presidency in 1968 and the launching of an era in which conservatives
regained control of the Court. 7 '
From the beginning, the Warren Court's activism on behalf of the equality and
rights of minorities (particularly African Americans) and the poor provoked loud,
bitter public protests. Particularly in the South, state political and religious leaders
called for Warren's "impeachment" and repeatedly resurrected the doctrine of
interposition (made popular initially by John Calhoun in the nullification
movement) as a check on its activism.' Governor George Talmadge of Georgia
charged that the Supreme Court had "reduced our Constitution to a mere scrap of
paper. It has blatantly ignored all law and precedent and usurped from the Congress
and from the Congress the
and the people the power to amend the Constitution
72
land."'
the
of
laws
the
make
to
authority
Southern members of Congress were equally if not more critical. In the
immediate wake of the Brown decision, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi
issued a short statement of resistance that read: "[The South] will not abide by nor
obey this legislative decision by a political court. We will take whatever steps are
necessary to retain segregation in education."'" Even more dramatic was the
statement of 10 1 members (nineteen senators and eighty-two representatives) of the
Southern delegation in Congress known as the "Southern Manifesto."' 74 The
Manifesto declared:
JAMES PATIrERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNrrED STATES

170

1945-1974, at 677

(1996). Patterson suggested that the "[b]acklash" to the liberal policies of the Great Society
and activism of the Warren Court:
grew more ominous as the presidential election of 1968 approached. Many
Americans... especially resented liberals - permissive, patronizing, hypocritical,
and sanctimonious do-gooders who reproved them for their resistance to the claims
of minorities and assorted trouble-makers. (A conservative, it was said, was a
liberal who had been mugged; a liberal was a conservative who hadn't been
mugged - yet.) In an increasingly fragmented and polarized society, these angry
people were a political force to be reckoned with.
Id.
'7'

See, e.g., S.J. Res. 3, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1956) (interposing the sovereignty

of Virginia against the Brown decision); see also SENATE OF VIRGINIA, COMMITTEE FOR
COURTS OF JUSTICE, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERPOSITION: ITS HISTORY AND APPuCATION, Reg.

Sess. (1957) (presenting a detailed study of the doctrine of interposition and its applicability

in the school desegregation context).
172 NADINE COHODAS, STROM THURMOND AND THE POLrIcs OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 254

(1993) (citation omitted).
173

id.

114See

102 CONG. REc. 4515 (1956) (statement of Rep. Smith).
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We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a
clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal
judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the
people.... [T]he Supreme Court of the United States, with no legal
basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power
and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the
established law of the land. .

.

. We decry the Supreme Court's

encroachment on rights reserved to the States and to the people, contrary
to established law and to the Constitution. We commend the motives of
those States which have declared the intention to resist forced
integration by any lawful means.'
In Brown's immediate aftermath, the criticism of the Warren Court was hardly
limited to the Southern political establishment. Shortly before his untimely death
in 1954, Justice Robert Jackson penned a scathing indictment ofthe Court's activist
majority. He charged,
A cult of libertarian judicial activists now assails the Court ....This
cult appears to believe that the Court can find in a 4,000-word
eighteenth-century document or its nineteenth-century Amendments, or
can plausibly supply, some clear bulwark against all dangers and evils
that today beset us internally. This assumes that the Court will be the
dominant factor in shaping the constitutional practice of the future and
can and will maintain, not only equality with the elective branches, but
a large measure of supremacy and control over them.... [This] seems
to me a doctrine wholly incompatible with faith in democracy, and in so
far as it encourages a belief that judges may be left to correct the result
of public indifference to issues of liberty in choosing Presidents,
Senators, and Representatives, it is a vicious teaching. 76
Similarly, while delivering the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in 1958, Judge
Learned Hand rebuked the Warren Court as a "third legislative chamber.'" He
argued:
I cannot frame any definition that will explain when the Court will
173Id. at 4515-16.
176 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 57-58 (1955).
'7
LEARNED HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS 42 (1958).
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assume the role of a third legislative chamber and when it will limit its
authority to keeping Congress and the states within their accredited
authority. Nevertheless, I am quite clear that it has not abdicated its
former function, as to which I hope that it may be regarded as
permissible for me to say that I have never been able to understand on
178
what basis it does or can rest except as a coup de main.
And, in 1960, Justice Frankfurter, in the course of reminiscing on the Court's path
during his career, pointedly singled out Thayer's 1893 article on judicial restraint
as "the great guide for judges and therefore, the great guide for understanding by
non-judges of what the place of the judiciary is in relation to constitutional
179
questions."
These liberal critics werejust the tip of the iceberg- the Warren Court had not
yet even entered the period during which it is commonly thought its true liberal
activism flourished. A wave of bad publicity, including a denunciation by the
American Bar Association Committee on Communist Strategy, engulfed the Court
in the late 1950s.180 Walter Murphy observed that at this time there was a "quiet but
unmistakable undertone on Capitol Hill, a fear not only among conservatives but
among moderates as well as some liberals that the justices had gone too far in
protecting individual rights and in so doing had moved into the legislative
8
domain." '
As Lucas Powe recounts, the "summer of 1958 witnessed a battle over judicial
power not quite comparable to Roosevelt's Court-packing plan twenty-one years
earlier but close enough for Court supporters."' 82 During this period, conservatives
responded to the Court's overruling of congressional attempts to restrict political
dissent with accusations of Communist sympathies;8 3 and James Eastland, by then
an implacable foe of the Court, spearheaded one of several attempts to curb its
jurisdiction. 84 Indeed, bill after bill was added to the Eighty-Fifth Congress's
burgeoning inventory of Court-curbing proposals. The suggested legislation
included plans to give the Senate appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court, to
allow Congress to reverse the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, to require
a unanimous decision to invalidate a state law, and even one measure which would
178

Id. at 55.

179 FELIX FRANKFURTER, REMINISCES

347 (1960).

"80 See POWE, supra note 168, at 100.
181

WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL PROCESS 116 (1962).
182

See POWE, supra note 168, at 127.
104 CONG. REc. 2011 (1958) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[The] Warren

183 See, e.g.,

Court has now thrown its protective cloak around fellow travelers and Communists. The
Court is simply blind to the reality of our time.").
184 See POWE, supra note 168, at 128.
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have ordered lower courts to disregard any Supreme Court decision "which
conflicts with the legal principle of adhering to prior decisions and which is clearly
based upon considerations other than legal."'8 5 These measures barely failed. As
Robert McCloskey observed, "[t]he 1958 counter-attack on the Court, even though
it failed, can still be regarded as a firebell in the night; it did come shockingly close
to succeeding."'8 6
The attacks on the Warren Court persisted for more than a decade, though the
political climate in which it rendeted its decisions became somewhat more
hospitable in the mid-1960s 87 For instance, in 1958, state chiefjustices formally
issued a report that condemned the Warren Court's "activism" for expanding federal
powers at the expense of the states. 88 In that same year, there were press reports
that many justices lacked competence and that, according to former Jackson law
clerk William Rehnquist, the Court's law clerks showed "extreme solicitude for
claims of Communists and other criminal defendants [and] expansion of federal
power at the expense of state power."' 89 In 1962, the Council on State Governments
formally declared its support for amendments that would permit state legislatures
to amend the Constitution without consideration or discussion in any federal forum,
that would make apportionment in the state legislatures immune to federal judicial
review, and that would create a special court consisting of the chief justices of all
fifty states empowered to overrule Supreme Court decisions involving federal-state
relations. 9
In that same year, liberal newspapers heaped praise on the Warren Court's
decision striking down school prayer,9 while conservative papers such as The Wall
Street Journalcondemned the decision for "violent wrecking of the Constitution's
language" and for being "symptomatic of a broader move in the nation toward the
rigid exclusion of all traces of religion in the public schools."' 92 Also, in 1962,
many national and state political leaders excoriated Baker v. Carr,"3 including
Senator Richard Russell who denounced the case as "another major assault on our

'8

MURPHY, supra note 181, at 116 (footnote and citation omitted).

186 Robert G.

McCloskey, Reflections on the Warren Court, 51 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1258
(1965), in POWE, supra note 168, at 134.
187POWE, supra note 168, at 214.
188 Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations as Affected by Judicial Decisions
27-29 (1958), in POWE, supra note 168, at 139.
.89 Who Writes Decisions ofthe SupremeCourt?, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13,
1957, at 74, in POWE, supra note 168, at 139 (the story on law clerks provoked one senator
to call for an investigation of the Court's law clerks).
190 See MASON, supra note 108, at 243.
'9' Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
192 WALL ST. J., June 27, 1962, at 14, in POWE, supra note 168, at 187-88. Religious
organizations and leaders also split on Engle. See POWE, supra note 168, at 188.
'"
Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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In 1964, the Republican presidential candidate Barry

Goldwater declared that of all three branches, "today's Supreme Court is the least

faithful to the constitutional tradition of limited government, and to the principle of
legitimacy in the exercise of power."" The Republican platform in 1964 called for
a constitutional amendment to overturn the application of the Court's one person,
one vote rule to both chambeis.'9 The Escobedo decision,97 issued in the same
year, raised, in historian John Morton Blum's estimation, "the storm against the
Court to gale force."' " Goldwater attacked the Court in the aftermath of Escobedo
for "contributing to the breakdown of law and order in the cities."' 99 Two years
later, the Warren Court's Miranda decision, according to Yale Kamisar,
"galvanized opposition to the Warren Court into a potent political force," 2'
including Congress's passage of legislation to curb its effects.2",
As the decade was winding down, Abe Fortas's controversial nomination as
chief justice generated a heated confirmation battle, which featured vitriolic
opposition from many Southern senators against the Warren Court's "liberal
activism" and even a thirty-minute film featuring stills from movies Fortas had held
protected by the First Amendment.20 2 At the time ofFortas's confirmation hearings,
polls showed the vast majority of Americans holding the Supreme Court in low

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1962, at 1, in POWE, supra note 168, at 203-04.
22 CONG. Q. 2534 (1964), in POwE, supra note 168, at 238.
196 See id. at 252.
'9
'"

378 U.S. 478 (1964).
JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DIscoID 210 (1991).
'"
PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION INCRISIS TIMES 381 (1972), in PowE, supra
note 168, at 391-92.
200 POWE, supra note 168, at 399 (quoting Yale Kamisar, The Warren Courtand Criminal
Justice, in THE WARREN COURT 139 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996)).
20 The legislation passed by Congress was ultimately codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which purported to make any confession "admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a). In Dickersonv. UnitedStates, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme Court
struck down this statute on separation of powers grounds. In an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court declared that "Miranda,being a constitutional decision of this Court,
may not in effect be overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda
ourselves." Id. at 432. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that:
Given § 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of
admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial
courts to consider a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of
a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its
enactment to overrule Miranda.
Id. at 436.
202 See POWE, supra note 168, at 471-72.
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To forestall any further liberal judicial activism, conservatives would have to
do more than join in or even lead criticizing the Court; they would have to win the
presidency and alter the membership of the Court. Their chance would come in the
form of Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon, who made clear that he
was "running against Warren and his Court as much as he was running against his
Democratic rival, Senator Hubert Humphrey. "2 '> Nixon's victory was due in no
small measure to the opposition to the Warren Court. As George Nash noted,

[I]n a curious way, the Supreme Court did come to exert a significant
influence on the postwar conservative intellectual movement.... By
forcing to the surface in the most dramatic cases some of the most
profound questions about the nature of American life and the entire
political process, by making issues of such supreme gravity public and
debatable, the Warren Court helped polarize the Left and Right. And
polarization is the first step toward self-definition.2 °5
Once back in power, Republican leaders asserted very different constitutional
visions to those that had dominated and moved the Warren Court over the preceding
sixteen years. As conservatives sharpened their constitutional philosophy, liberals
would increasingly fragment over their attitudes about the Warren Court.
VII. THE BURGER COURT, 1969-1986

When Richard Nixon found himself with four vacancies on the Supreme Court
to fill in his first three years as president, there were both hopes and fears of a
revolution in American constitutional law. As a candidate and as president, Nixon
repeatedly promised to appoint:
"[S]trict constructionists" who would see "their duty as interpreting law
and not making law"; who would follow a "properly conservative" course
ofludging that would, in particular, protect society's "peace forces" against
the "criminal forces"; and who would "see themselves as caretakers of the
Constitution and servants of the people, not superlegislators with a free
hand to impose their social and political viewpoints upon the American

203

Id. at 473.

204

ROBERT WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 10

omitted in original).

(1979) (citation

20 GEORGE H. NASH,THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALMOVEM ENT INAMERICA SINCE

1945, at 199 (2d ed. 1996).
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People." 206
President Nixon did not elaborate on these "criteria." In time, Nixon would succeed
in appointing four justices, whose common link their opposition to the liberal
activism of the Warren Court rather than a commitment to a specific, alternative
ideology.
By 1986, seven of the Court's justices had been appointed by Republican
presidents who had campaigned against and were openly critical of the Warren
Court's activism."' In the last four years of the Burger Court, only two of the nine
justices had been appointed by Democratic presidents (though Republican
presidents had appointed Democrats William Brennan and Lewis Powell).
Yet these Republican appointees did not produce the expected results. Instead,
the big story of the Burger years was the counter-revolution that did not occur.
Scholars have given different explanations and characterizations of what transpired
during the seventeen-year course of the Burger Court. David Currie suggests,
The most notable decisions of the Burger Court were those that appeared
to extend the work of the Warren period, not to restrict it. It was the Burger
Court, not its predecessor, that first protected abortion and commercial
speech and legitimated busing and affirmative action; that first curbed sex
discrimination, political patronage, and aid to parochial schools; that even
called a temporary end to capital punishment." 8
In some instances, the Burger Court did, however, pull back from the
implications of some of its initial decisions.2" In addition, almost from the first, the
new justices demonstrated a tendency to nibble away one case at a time at the
edifice of criminal procedure that the Warren Court had erected,210 while a series
note 18, at 298-99 (quoting Campaign Speech (Nov. 2, 1968), in 27
CONG. Q., WEEKLY REPORT, May 23, 1969, at 798).
2o" See generallyABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 251-89.
208 CURRIE, supra note 123, at464 (emphasis added). The cases that correspond with the
206 ABRAHAM,supra

issues Currie identifies as first addressed by the Burger Court are: Brantiv. Finkel,445 U.S.
507 (1980) (political patronage); Regents of the Univ. ofCal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(affirmative action); Elrodv. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (political patronage); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (commercial speech); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

(abortion); Furmanv. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (sex discrimination); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (parochial
schools); and Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (197 1) (busing).
209 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend the Court's
substantive due process arguments of Roe to homosexuality); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating an affrmnative action program).
20 Two lines of cases chipped away at the twin pillars of the Warren Court's criminal
procedure edifice. The first, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (prohibiting the use of
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of decisions upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining suggested that it
hardly mattered what procedures were required in the uncommon event of a trial."'
Only a partial explanation for the Burger Court's failure to reverse the Warren
Court's revolution lies in the fact that it was not until 1975 that the new Republican
justices constituted a working majority. Equally important is the fact that at least
three of them (Blackmun, Stevens, and Powell) did not perform with quite as much
The most dramatic
fidelity to judicial restraint as originally expected.1
illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials), was significantly weakened by United States
v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338 (1974), United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), United States v.
Havens,446 U.S. 620 (1980), UnitedStates v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and INSv. Lopez-

Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). In the second, the Mirandadecision suffered a similar fate,
as it was weakened in Harrisv. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974), North Carolinav. Butler,441 U.S. 369 (1979), Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980), Californiav. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
211 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
212 None of the three thought of himself, at least at the beginning of his tenure, as a
judicial activist President Nixon introduced Powell to the nation as a"strict constructionist,"
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 349 (1994) (citation omitted in
original). Though Powell avoided using the same phrase in describing his judicial
philosophy, he told the Senate Judiciary Committee in his confirmation hearings, "Ibelieve
in the importance ofjudicial restraint, especially at the Supreme Court level.... In deciding
each case, the judge must make a conscious and determined effort to put aside his own
political and economic views and his own predilections and to the extent possible to put
aside whatever subtle influences may exist from his own background and experience." Id.
at 349 (citation omitted in original). At his confirmation hearings in 1970, Harry Blackmun
endorsed an even more restrictive judicial ideology: "I personally feel that the Constitution
is a document of specified words and construction. I would do my best not to have my
decision affected by my personal ideals and philosophy, but would attempt to construe that
document in the light of what I feel is its definite and determined meaning." Id. Similarly,
in a letter responding to a series of written questions regarding his jurisprudential
philosophy, Justice Stevens wrote:

I [would not] feel free to construe the broad phrases of the Constitution on the
basis of my own personal philosophy ....

It is never appropriate for a judge

interpreting the Constitution... to disregard the intent of its authors to the extent
that such intent can be fairly ascertained .... The fact that a Justice of the Supreme
Court feels that a particular constitutional provision is not adequate to deal with
today's social conditions is not a sufficient basis for placing a construction on that
document which is not warranted by its language or by the course of decisions
interpreting it.
Letter from John Paul Stevens to Sen. James Eastland (Dec. 8, 1975), reprinted in
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transformation involved Justice Blackmun. ' 3
Such a transformation would not be lost on the next Republican president,
Ronald Reagan, who made as a centerpiece of his agenda the appointment ofjudges
committed to "strict construction of the Constitution rather than a liberal agenda
'
based on a concept of judicial activism."2 14
His administration wasted no time in
developing a careful screening process to verify whether prospective nominees had
the appropriate ideology for appointment,2 ' culminating in the appointments as
federal appellate judges several prominent conservative academics - most notably
Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, Ralph Winter, Frank Easterbrook,
Douglas Ginsburg, and J. Harvie Wilkinson - who helped to demonstrate on the
bench and explain in other fora their conceptions of appropriate judicial restraint.2" 6
Many of these appointees explained that their commitment to judicial restraint was
made possible by hewing closely to original understanding; thus, originalism
became closely associated with the most prominent conservative judges of the
era.

2 17

Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearing on
Nomination ofJohn PaulStevens ofIllinois, to be an Associate Justiceof the United States
Supreme CourtBefore The Senate Committee on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 8 (1975). In his
oral testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Stevens also stated: "One
should always subordinate his own personal views, whether they be economic, social,
political... because when you are talking about your own views you are only one of
millions of individuals in the country." Id. at 44.
213

See DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OFTHE REHNQUISTCOURT 233-34

(1992):
After the Roe opinion, Blackmun appeared to undergo one of the great
transformations in Supreme Court history. In 1970, Nixon had selected him as
a midwestern Republican with a law-and-order reputation.... By the mid1970s, however, Blackmun had broken with Burger and aligned himself with the
Court's liberals... [One possible explanation] is that Nixon and the press had
typecast him incorrectly in the first place.... Blackmun was never a Nixon
Republican and had little allegiance to the conservative dogma.
Id.

214
211

ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 281.
See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE

CONSTITUTION:

TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 222-49 (1990).
216 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution,OriginalIntent,and EconomicRights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95
HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982);Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the FourthAmendment, 1981 SUP.
CT. REV. 49 (1981); Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatismand the Legal Order,9 HARV.
J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 123 (1986).
217 See Earl M. Maltz, Brown v. Board of Education and "Originalism," in GREAT
CASES, supra note 45, at 136, 141-42:
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One common perspective of the Burger Court is that on core constitutional
issues the justices who served on the Burger Court divided on the basis of their
political ideology. In his excellent book on the chiefjusticeship of Warren Burger,
the distinguished conservative constitutional scholar Earl Maltz takes issue with this
viewpoint and argues instead that it "can plausibly be seen as having produced the
most liberal jurisprudence in history - even more liberal than that generated by its
predecessor."" In Maltz's view,
[T]he Burger Court advanced well beyond Warren Court jurisprudence on
a variety of issues identified with liberal politics. Further, while cutting
back at the margins, the Burger Court refused to overrule the core
principles underlying Warren Courtjurisprudence dealing with issues such
as reapportionment and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. However, given
the makeup ofthe Court, what is perhaps most surprising is that its activism
was almost entirely liberal-oriented; although there were a few notable
exceptions, decisions invoking conservative values to strike down liberal
initiatives from other branches of government were extremely rare during

the Burger era219
In their respective appraisals of the Burger Court, Vince Blasi and Bernard
Schwartz concluded, however, that the Burger Court's jurisprudence lacked any
discernible focus - that it should be characterized as "rootless activism"22 or
simply "pragmatic. 22' Maltz agrees, to some extent, with these appraisals. He
recognizes that: "[T]he Court was composed of nine independent contractors with
widely differing political and jurisprudential agendas. Thus, it should not be
surprising that the pattern of decisions emerging from the Court reflected the
shifting coalitions among these independent contractors rather than a single, easily

[T]he debate over originalist methodology divided the country along political
lines. Many conservatives attacked not only the substantive conclusions of postBrown jurisprudence, but also the legitimacy of judicial activism that was not
founded on the original understanding. Liberals ... increasingly saw an

unconstrained Court as a reliable political ally; thus, originalism became
anathema in liberal ideology.
Id.
218

EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969-1986, at 1

(2000).
219

Id. at 1-2.

no Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REvOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
221 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT
INACTION

(1990).
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described intellectual theme."" Refusing to rest on this conclusion, Maltz asserts
that,
[T]o concede that the patterns of decision making are not easily described
does not imply that the patterns are nonexistent; instead, it simply suggests
that the decisions are the product of the patterns of decision making ofeach
of the individual justices, patterns which themselves reflect varying
combinations of purely political and distinctively legal considerations. 223
Yet, as one moves away from the academic commentary on the Burger Court,
one quickly discovers the increasingly intensifying social and political divisions
generated by the Burger Court's decisions, including abortion rights cases."
Though the controversy over the abortion rights cases presented a rare opportunity
for the public debate over the direction of the courts to address the implications of
technology (in the form of certain medical procedures), Roe and its progeny were
viewed more as a symptom of the problem with the Court than the problem itself.
The problem was the Court's failure to respect federalism, and its solution was, as
characterized by President Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese, adherence to
a "Jurisprudence of Original Intention. 225 With Roe, free speech, freedom of
religion, and other precedents expanding rather than overruling Warren Court
precedents in mind, Meese explained,
[lI]t is our belief that constitutional law should be rooted in principles that
are derived from the text and original intention of the Constitution... [and
that s]uch disputes are properly resolved within the several states at the
level of civil or legal rights, as a matter of statutory law; not at the national
226
level as a matter of constitutional right.
This line of commentary provoked much criticism from liberals on the Court and

223

supra note 218, at 5.
Id. (footnote omitted).

224

One of the most significant developments, which was beyond the scope of Maltz's

222

MALTZ,

study, was the increasing fragmentation of liberals over the most "activist" of the Warren
and Burger Court precedents, including but not limited to Roe. For an account of the
splintering of liberals into, inter alia, the feminist, critical legal studies, and Critical Race
Theory movements, see Grey, supra note 100, at 505-07.
2 Address to the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprintedin MAJOR POLICY
STATEMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: EDWIN MEESE III 1985-88, at 7.
226 Address to the American Enterprise Institute (Aug. 6, 1985), reprinted in MAJOR
POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL: EDWIN MEESE mI 1985-88, at 12; see
also Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, Commencement Address at Tulane
University (Oct. 21, 1986), reprintedin id. at 45-5 1.
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in Congress. Leading the charge, Justice William Brennan called Meese's approach
"facile historicism" that "in truth is little more than arrogance cloaked as
humility." ' Later the same month, Justice Stevens suggested that the argument for
reliance on original intention "is somewhat incomplete [because] it overlooks the
importance of subsequent events in the development of our law." 2 8 Senator Joseph
Biden accused Meese of holding "extreme and unacceptable views" and attempting
229
"to rewrite in his own image our most basic law."
Moreover, the Burger Court repeatedly found itself the target ofjurisdictionstripping measures proposed in retaliation against the Court's desegregation,
freedom of religion, and abortion decisions.23 ° In addition, it became routine for
members of Congress to propose amendments to overturn Roe and other "liberal"
precedents of the Burger Court;' and some members of Congress even proposed
to do away with life tenure in response to the Burger Court's activism.2 3'
These congressional attempts came to naught. Nor did any of these efforts have
any apparent effect on the Court's path. Instead, change in the Court's functioning
came, as it has often come in the past, from new appointments to the Court.
VI.

THE REHNQUIST COURT, 1986 - THE PRESENT

Except for one very intense year early during Warren Burger's tenure as chief
justice, 233 there were no fierce Supreme Court confirmation contests, in spite of the
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Brennan Opposes Legal View Urged By Administration, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1. The liberal attacks on the use of original intent were not limited
to the Court. Biden Says Meese is Trying to Reshape US. Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7,1985, at A20.
228 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Stevens, In Rare Criticism,DisputesMeese on Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1985, at 1.
2"' Biden Says Meese isTrying to Reshape US. Constitution,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1985,
at A20. Senator Biden also stated: "The Attorney General's real position is little-disguised
social activism of the Right." Id.
23
See, e.g., Student Moratorium Transportation Act of 1972, S. 3388, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess.; H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (desegregation); Equal Educational Opportunities
Act of 1972, S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (desegregation);
H.R. 326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (school prayer); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (school prayer); H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (abortion).
231 See, e.g., H.R. 261, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.J. Res. 119, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); H.R.J. Res. 426, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
232 See, e.g., H.RJ. Res. 33, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 69, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 120, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 199, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 669, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 869, 93d Cong., 1st
2.

Sess. (1973).

In November 1969, the Senate rejected President Nixon's nomination of Clement
Haynsworth to replace Abe Fortas as an associate justice on the Supreme Court. Less than
six months later, the Senate rejected Nixon's next nominee, Harold Carswell, to fill the
233
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sharp criticisms of so many of the Court's decisions, most notoriously Roe.
Burger's resignation announcement coincided, however, with the dawn of a
different era; and the Rehnquist Court itself would not be able to begin formally
without the most contentious confirmation proceeding for a chief justice since
Hughes's confirmation in 1930.
The opposition to Rehnquist's nomination as chiefjustice quickly targeted his
judicial ideology.2 34 His record in individual rights cases as an associate justice was
not only well known but, in the views of liberal Senate opponents, "out of the
mainstream."23 Rehnquist largely dodged questions about how he would rule in
future cases on the grounds that they impinged on judicial independence.
Nevertheless, the Republican-controlled Senate confirmed Rehnquist 65-33. The
thirty-three votes cast against his nomination constituted the largest number of votes
ever cast against a successful nominee for the chiefjusticeship.
It was just the beginning of the storm, for later in 1986 the Democrats regained
control of the Senate. Hence, they were in the majority when Lewis Powell
announced his intention to resign from the Court in 1987. The significance of
President Reagan's naming Powell's successor was not lost on anyone, for Powell
had been, as The New York Times reported at the time of the announcement of his
resignation, "the determined moderate [who had cast the] critical fifth votes in key
Supreme Court rulings. [Thus, h]is resignation gave President Reagan a historic
'
opportunity to shape the future of the court."236
President Reagan's choice of
Robert Bork to replace Powell promised, however, to be contentious not only
because Powell had been the swing vote in so many important cases, but also
because Bork had been among the most outspoken critics of the Warren and Burger
Courts' decisions expanding the scope of the Bill of Rights' guarantees.237
vacancy arising from Fortas's resignation from the Court. Neither rejection had a lot to do
with the ideology of the nominee. The Democratically-led Senate rejected Haynsworth in
part as payback for Fortas being driven off the Court because of his ethical lapses as a sitting
Justice. The opposition to Haynsworth claimed he had committed ethical breaches no less
serious than those made by Fortas. Subsequently, the Senate rejected Carswell based on
serious questions about his competence to serve on the Court. See generallyDAVID YALOF,
PuRsUrr OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT

NOMINEES 104-12 (1999)

(discussing the problems leading to the Senate's rejections of

President Nixon's nominations of Clement Haynsworth in 1969 and Harold Carswell in
1970).
234 Rehnquist also confronted charges that as a law clerk for Justice Jackson in 1953
he
had urged Jackson to support the constitutionality of segregated schools and in the 1960s he
had harassed minority workers at polling places. O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 71.
235 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 292 (citation omitted in original).
236

Id. at 297.

See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Constitution,OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986); Tradition and Moralityin ConstitutionalLaw,The Francis
Boyer Lectures on Public Policy (American Enterprise Institute, Dec. 1984); Neutral
237
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Bork's confirmation hearings were among the most contentious ever. Like
Brandeis, Bork faced charges that he was a "radical., 238 The more Bork tried to
portray himself as a moderate who had "great respect for precedent,"239 the more he
opened himself to charges of a "confirmation conversion"2" due to his harshlyworded critiques of the "liberal" precedents of the Warren and Burger Courts and
his declarations that "in the field of constitutional law, precedent is not all that
important."2 4' The subsequent testimony of over one hundred witnesses on the
nomination's merits and on differing approaches to constitutional interpretation
represented, in Senator Joseph Biden's judgment, "a referendum on the past
'
progress of the Supreme Court and a referendum on the future."242
In the end, the
interest groups and politicians who had become invested in the very precedents
Bork had so long attacked forged successful opposition to his nomination. He
became the first Supreme Court nominee to be rejected on the basis of ideology
since John Parker. While Parker had been rejected largely because of controversy
over the scope of the federal government's power to regulate the economy, 243 Bork
had been rejected largely because of his hostility to many of the Warren and Burger
Courts' most prominent individual rights decisions, especially those expanding
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees and protecting aspects of
privacy in Griswoldv. Connecticut" and Roe.
Shortly after his rejection, Bork published a scathing attack on the liberal
interest groups, intellectuals, and politicians who organized his defeat.24 He
defended the originalist philosophy he had advanced as an academic, circuit judge,
and Supreme Court nominee. He explained that his confirmation hearings:
merely brought [trends toward censoring or punishing conservative
thought] into the open in a way that had never previously occurred but was
bound to happen sooner or later as conservative presidents, armed with the
nomination power, begin to threaten the liberal hegemony over the courts.
[My] book has traced the increasingly political nature of the Supreme
Court, which reached its zenith with the Warren Court, and the increasing,
by now almost overwhelming, politicization of the law schools, where

Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
2 O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 74 (citation omitted in original).
9 Id. at 75 (citation omitted in original).
240 Id. at 75 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy) (citation omitted in original).
241 Id. (citation omitted in original).
242 Id. at 76 (quoting Sen. Joseph Biden) (citation omitted in original).
243 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
244 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
245

LAW

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

(1990).
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much constitutional scholarship is now only politics."
Bork castigated liberal academics for helping to orchestrate his defeat. In his view,
"I had criticized the Warren Court, and [the ideological attack on my nomination]
was the revenge of the Warren Court., 247 The book confirmed his opponents' worst
fears about his disdain for the individual rights precedents most commonly
associated with the liberalism of the Warren and Burger Courts. 4 8
The next extensive battle over a Supreme Court nomination came four years
later with President George Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas to replace
Thurgood Marshall. Like Reagan, Bush had campaigned as the nominee of a party
that had explicitly called for the overruling of Roe and pledged to appoint "a strict
constructionist, a judicial restraintist, [someone who was] dedicated to legal and
constitutional precedent and history."2' 9 His nomination was complicated by
several extenuating circumstances: He had a record of controversial writings and
speeches that assailed some of the Warren and Burger Courts' best-known decisions
expanding individual rights; the person he was replacing - Thurgood Marshall was a living liberal legend; and President Bush had raised expectations regarding
his credentials by promising that he was the "best person at the right time" to
replace the retiring Justice Marshall. 5 ° If that was not enough, a former assistant
had accused him of sexual harassment in the midst of his confirmation hearings.2 '
Thomas weathered the storm in part because, on substantive constitutional
questions, he gave evasive answers, made no promises of how he would perform as
a justice, and on the harassment charges, he put his opposition on the defensive by
accusing it of racist motives. His eventual confirmation by the closest vote in favor
of any Supreme Court nominee in the twentieth century was not interpreted at the
time as a victory for any particular constitutional philosophy or as sending any kind
of clear signal on the Senate's preferences regarding the Court's composition or
direction.
With its current composition of seven justices appointed by Republican
presidents dedicated to the overrulings of many Warren and Burger Court
precedents and only two by Democratic President Bill Clinton, the Rehnquist Court

2'4 Id. at

348.
Id. at 349.
248 In his book, Bork targeted many of the nation's leading liberal constitutional theorists.
More than a few responded. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, RobertBork's GrandInquisition,
99 YALE L.J. 1419 (1990); Ronald M. Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence,57 U. CHI. L. REV.
657 (1990); see also Suzanna Sherry, OriginalSin, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215 (1990).
249 ABRAHAM, supranote 18, at 305 (paraphrasing Bush's pledges).
20 Id. at 310 (citation omitted in original).
21 For an overview of the contest over Thomas's nomination, see JANE MAYER & JILL
247

ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994).
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is still a work in progress.252 Over the course of its fifteen years (and counting), the
Rehnquist Court has been described as "conservative,"" 3 "liberal,""' "activist,"255
the model of restraint, 2 "' ' arrogant," 257 "betraying" the cause of conservatism, 258 and
"imperialist. 259 Such disparate reactions reflect, inter alia,the fact that the Court's
At present, the last vacancy to arise on the Court was seven years ago, the longest
period of time in which the Court has gone without a vacancy since the first half of the
nineteenth century.
" See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative Court? Yes, 1993 PUB. INT. L.
REv. 127 (1993) ("The Rehnquist Court truly is a conservative Court. It is so much of one,
in fact, that the disagreements on the Court and about the Court are now entirely debates
within conservatism, not between liberalism and conservatism.").
" See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Again, A Strugglefor the Soul of the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 1992, at A 19 (responding to the Court's decision in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), and asserting that the Court seems "given more to liberal activism than
to adherence to the principles of the Constitution as originally understood").
" See, e.g., Edward Walsh, An Activist CourtMixes Its High-ProfileMessages, WASH.
POST, July 2, 2000, at A6 (quoting national legal director of the ACLU Robert Shapiro as
stating: "It is still a conservative court that has also become one of the most activist courts
in American history.").
2"6 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, A LOOK AT... The Rehnquist Court; They Want to Be
Known as Jurists, Not Activists, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at B3 (calling the Rehnquist
Court "more restrained and legalistic" than its liberal activist predecessor).
252

" See, e.g., Renata Adler, IrreparableHarm, THENEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 2001 (stating

that the Court's "moral, intellectual, and legal authority had already diminished over a long
period of poorly reasoned opinions expressed in unseemly and unjudicial - often
supercilious and even sneering

-

words"); Carl T. Rowan, At Least Duke Isn 't a Closet

BigotLike Some, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 3, 1999, at A32 (asserting that"Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia are 'arrogant' in their approaches to race").
"5 Immediately after the Rehnquist Court's surprising 5-4 re-affirmation of Roe in
Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), conservative

leaders charged Justices O'Connor, Souter, and especially Kennedy (who had been
confirmed for the seat to which Bork had been nominated) with "betraying" the presidents
who had appointed them to the Court. See, e.g., Aaron Epstein, As High Court Shifts, Will

Center Hold?, THE RECORD, Oct. 4, 1992, at A22 ("Leaders in the conservative movement
felt betrayed, especially by what they perceived as a turnaround by Kennedy. They had
counted Kennedy as being well within the conservative orbit despite the absence of any
over-arching ideology."); Nancy E. Roman, "Wimp Bloc" DisappointsRight Wing, THE
WASH. TIM ES, June 30, 1992, at A I (quoting Gary Bauer as describing O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter as "quickly becoming an embarrassment to the presidents who appointed them").
"' See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference,THE NEW REPUBLIC Nov. 6,2000, at

38 ("The Rehnquist Court.. . routinely adopts an imperious tone.., even when striking
down relatively insignificant, symbolic laws, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
...

."); Patti Waldmeir, Rehnquist Term Muddied by PartisanSlur, FIN. TIMES, June 29,

2001, at 7 ("The justices even took their imperial approach so far as to dictate the rules of
professional golf to the PGA, which was overruled when it tried to insist that disabled
golfers should not be given special help to compete in elite tournaments.").
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Republican appointees do not share a monolithic conservative judicial philosophy,
but rather increasingly disagree over what principled fidelity to judicial restraint
2 60
entails.
Indeed, one prominent, self-described "conservative," Michael Stokes-Paulsen,
has suggested that understanding the Rehnquist Court, at least as of 1993, required
an appreciation ofthe variations ofjudicial restraint.26 ' In his view, the Republican
justices differed in terms of how they prioritized possible (or legitimate) sources of
decision, such as text, structure, precedent, and original understanding. In contrast,
liberal constitutional scholar Kathleen Sullivan has suggested that the Rehnquist
Court's justices could be understood not only in the terms with which Paulsen has
described them, but also their different preferences regarding the formulation of
'
legal principles as either "standards" or "rules."262
The common theme of Paulsen's
and Sullivan's analyses is to move away from the characterization of the justices as
"conservative." Though helpful in developing a different perspective on the Court's
Republican appointees, the schemes developed by both Paulsen and Sullivan are
incomplete, for neither explains how liberals fit into them - do Democratic
See generallyMICHAELJ. GERHARDT, ETAL, CONSTrTUTIONALTHEORY: ARGUMENTS

260

AND PERSPECTIVES 283-328 (2d ed. 2000) (providing overview of contemporary

conservative constitutional theory).
261

Michael Stokes-Paulsen, The Many Facesof "JudicialRestraint", 1993 PUB. INT. L.

REV. 3 (1993).
262 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L.
REV. 743 (1998) [hereinafter Sullivan, RehnquistCourt];KathleenM. Sullivan, The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). Dean Sullivan explains that

approaches to constitutional interpretation "that use categorical, formal, bright-line tests are
rule-like.... By contrast, constitutional tests that employ balancing, intermediate scrutiny,

or functional analysis operate as standards." Sullivan, Rehnquist Court,supraat 751-52. She
explains further that:
A preference for constitutional standards over ... rules will tend to register as
political moderation because, generally speaking, rules are more effective than

standards at effecting sharp and lasting changes in constitutional interpretation..
.. The use of standards tends to moderate sharp swings between ideological poles;
standards allow future courts more discretion to distinguish prior cases and decide
cases in fact-specific fashion, and thus to afford more solace and spin opportunities
to the losers.
Id. at 753. According to Dean Sullivan's criteria, only two justices appointed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush - Scalia and Thomas - generally have favored rules, while the other
three - O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter - have favored standards. Id. at 754. Dean
Sullivan suggests, however, that the preference "of standards over rules . . . leads

conservative Justices to reach results that, in a period when the Court is moving rightward,
appear more moderate or liberal than would a rule fashioned from a similar ideological
starting point." Id. at 756.
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appointees or liberals prioritize or develop standards or rules differently than their
Republican counterparts?
In spite of their academic appeal, the schemes suggested by Paulsen, Sullivan,
and others263 have yet to influence the content of political rhetoric about the Court.
The trend among commentators remains characterizing the Court in the same terms
as it traditionally has been analyzed. For example, scholars talk in terms ofjudicial
activism and restraint as well as about liberal and conservative ideology. 2"
Moreover, in a recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Democratic senators and
witnesses supported a more exacting Senate inquiry into the ideologies ofjudicial
nominees while Republican senators and witnesses resisted it.26 5 Many witnesses
2 s
persisted in describing nominees as either liberals or conservatives. "
In the coming years, we can expect characterizing judicial ideology in the
traditional terms of "conservative," "liberal," "activist," or adherence to "judicial
restraint," to be of only limited utility. The first reason is ideological drift. In the
world of constitutional law, there are few fixtures. Looking back, as well as ahead,
in 1941, eminent constitutional scholar Edward Corwin noted that "[c]onstitutional

263 See, e.g., CASS

R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT (1999).

' See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R- Hensley, Assessing the Conservatism of
the RehnquistCourt, 77 JUDICATURE 83 (1993); Robert H. Smith, Uncouplingthe "Centrist
Bloc ":An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Thesis of a Dominant,Moderate Bloc on the United

States Supreme Court,62 TENN.L. REV. 1(1994) (proposing that there is a "moderate" bloc
on the Court).

265 See Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001 Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary,107TH CONG. (2001). Another interesting facet of the testimony given before the

committee is that two former White House Counsels - C. Boyden Gray (first Bush
Administration) and Lloyd N. Cutler (Carter and Clinton Administrations) - were opposed
to any extensive Senate inquiry into ideology. Their agreement across party lines perhaps
reflects their shared preference to protect executive prerogatives in the judicial selection
process.
266 The sensitivity to the ideology of judicial nominees was the central focus of the
hearings. For example, in his opening statement Democratic Senator Charles Schumer
stated:
The President, of course, can choose to exercise his nomination power however he
sees fit. But if the President sends countless nominees who are of a particular
ideological caste, Democrats will likely exercise their constitutionally-given power
to deny confirmation so that such nominees do not reorient the direction of the
federal judiciary. But if the President does not grossly inject ideological politics
into his selection criteria, neither will the Senate.

638
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law has always a central interest to 0guard. ' 67 If anything has changed over the
years in constitutional law, it has been the "central interest" that those empowered
to discharge constitutional functions have been trying to protect. Hence, the same
themes - abuse of power, judicial usurpation and restraint, and unprincipled
activism - have been sounded throughout the past century: In Thayer's classic
plea of 1893 forjudicial self-restraint;2 6 in President Roosevelt's impassioned radio
"chat" of March 9, 1937, calling for re-organization of the federal judiciary;2 69 in
the unsuccessful crusade in 1957 to curb judicial enforcement of certain provisions
of the Bill of Rights; 2 70 in Senator Everet Dirksen's repeated attempts to undo by
constitutional amendment the 1964 "one man, one-vote" ruling on state legislative
apportionment; 271 and underlying the proposed constitutional amendments to outlaw
busing, overturn Roe, authorize states to outlaw flag-burning, eliminate life tenure
for federal judges, and make Supreme Court decisions overturning state and federal
laws subject to a congressional veto.272 Judicial restraint is no more the singular
province of conservatives than activism is the penchant of only liberals.
Second, the fragmentation of liberalism has produced confusion and uncertainty
about what exactly a contemporary "liberal" judge would favor. Liberalism has
fractured to such an extent that it is virtually impossible to say that political or
judicial liberals would agree on a positive ideology any longer. Whereas Bork
recounts the trepidation of some conservatives openly to embrace originalism after
his rejection for fear of hurting their chances for prestigious judicial
appointments, 273 it is at least as true that many prominent constitutional scholars
eschew being called "liberal" and consider it a negative label in constitutional
politics. 274 Moreover, as Paulsen's analysis suggests, we can expect further
fragmentation of conservatives. Splits likely will arise not only in how
conservatives prioritize sources of constitutional authority, but also exacerbate
divisions among libertarians, social conservatives, moral skeptics, and those who
267 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
261 See supra note 30.

viii (194 1).

Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937), in VI THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OFFRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT (1938-50), at 122-33 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
270 See MURPHY, supra note 182, at 154-208.
271 See Legislative Apportionment: The Latest Proposal Analyzed, Cong. Rec., 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., app. 1-3 (Oct. 5, 1965) (remarks of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings); James C.
Millstone, Dirksen Hires Publicity Firm to Promote His Amendment, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 5, 1966.
272 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT H. BORK,
SLOUCHINGTOWARDSGOMORRAH 117 (1996) (advocating a congressional veto overjudicial
review).
273 BORK, supra note 245, at 347-48.
274 Cf Mark A. Graber, The ClintonificationofAmerican Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997) (criticizing, inter alia, the
reluctance of liberal scholars to embrace the implications of their liberal ideologies).
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favor property rights and natural law.
The terms "conservative," "liberal," "judicial restraint," and "activist" engender
further complications when one considers some of the consequences that
technological advances pose for the future of the Supreme Court's agenda,
particularly in cases involving Bill of Rights claims. The Court has not yet grappled
with the implications of technological advancements across the spectrum of Bill of
Rights cases.2" At the very least, technological advances pose an increasing range
of questions to which conservatives and liberals have yet to develop any systematic
responses. Although some individuals have begun to think through some of these
issues,276 they do not represent or speak for any organized perspective or school of

thought.
The problem is not just that "conservatives" and "liberals" have yet to develop
systematic analyses ofthe constitutional issues triggered by technological advances.
A further complication is that the political and judicial authorities responsible for
resolving the questions triggered by technological advances lack the requisite
expertise for understanding the technology, much less the problems produced by it.
An even bigger problem arises from the fact that by the time lawmakers or judges
have addressed the issues raised by the technological advances that have come
before them, the technology often has moved on. The end result is a peculiar
circumstance in which the law, either in the form of legislation or judicial review,
is well behind where technology is. Nor can the law ever gain ground. It is
hopelessly forever trying to catch up.
The extent of this problem is dramatically apparent when one considers the
range of possible constitutional issues triggered by recent technological advances
that legislators and judges are trying to master. The extent of the problem creates
the possibility of what I describe as a virtual Bill of Rights. By this, I do not just
mean the realm of cyberspace that no doubt challenges state and federal regulators
and judges, but a broader conception of the many instances in which legal and
One of the first times technological advancements culminated in a controversial line
of individual rights claims arose in the economic due process cases, including Lochner,
which resulted in part from the social and economic disparities produced by mass
industrialization. The next publicly divisive line of individual rights decisions triggered by
technological developments appears to be Roe and its progeny. To be sure, there were cases
before Roe, such as Skinner and Griswold,that dealt as well with reproductive technologies;
however, these cases hardly generated anything close to the ongoing social and political
division provoked by Roe.
276 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)
(pointing out that technological advances present possible First Amendment, intellectual
property, and Fourth Amendment difficulties for the Court); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech in Cyberspacefrom the Listener'sPerspective: PrivateSpeech Restrictions,Libel,
State Action, Harassment,andSex, 1996 U. CHI. LEGALF. 377 (1996) (analyzing three types
of online recreation, including edited electronic references and parental control).
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constitutional protections are unavailable to individual citizens while legislators and
judges are gearing up for action. Even when officials propose solutions for certain
technological questions, the technology with which they have been dealing - in
many instances - has already become advanced in ways that the legislative or
judicial solutions have failed to adequately anticipate.
The First Amendment, to begin with, is a realm in which such issues flourish.
Consider the relatively small range of problems involved in the following:
providing adequate access to and quality of filtering mechanisms on the Internet;
the failures thus far in government-mandated regulations of indecency or
pornography on the Internet; the challenges of devising adequate regulations or
control of unsolicited commercial advertising spread on the Internet; the difficulties
of developing special rules with respect to access, advertising, and usage for the
members of special communities such as public high schools and universities; and
the fact that the Internet has already made prior restraint doctrine passe, because by
the time information has been leaked onto the Internet and spread almost
instantaneously around the world, it no longer makes sense to seek a judicial
remedy to block its publication. That technology now allows people to vote from
their home computers raises questions about the conditions that government may
place on such activity (in those jurisdictions that allow such absentee voting). Nor
is it settled, much less clear, whether there are any First or Second Amendment
problems with state or federal restrictions of sales of certain items over the Internet,
including guns, tobacco products, and liquor.
The Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
undoubtedly is triggered by advancements in surveillance technology. Although the
Supreme Court recently held that the Fourth Amendment governs police use of
sense-enhancing technologies for searches,277 there are questions about the extent
to which the Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement use of hidden
surveillance cameras to monitor traffic or activity in large public areas - for
example, in Times Square27 - by speedily matching the images of people being
monitored against massive data banks. There are also Fourth and Fifth Amendment
issues triggered by the relative ease of government access to personal information
on traveling (as reflected, for example, in the EZ Passes employed for traveling
along some turnpikes), personal habits (as reflected, for example, in sales receipts),
and health (from blood or hair samples).279 Moreover, a recent controversy arose
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Many other cities are stepping up the use of surveillance cameras as well. See, e.g.,
Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowds for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2001 atAl; Dorothy Erlich, BigBrotheris Watching- On Trains, Streets, in Schools, SAN.
277
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FRAN. CHRON., May 2, 2000 at A21.

9 See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (banning non-voluntary
drug testing of pregnant women).
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when the Ninth Circuit - with conservative federal appellate Judge Alex Kozinski
as its chief spokesperson - formally objected to the monitoring of the judges' and
their staffs' computer usage by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts in the nation's Capitol.2 0 Judge Kozinski argued, inter alia, that the
monitoring constituted unwarranted, if not illegal, invasions of the privacy of the
court's judges and other personnel. The Administrative Office backed its policy of
monitoring for pornography, streaming videos, and music; and the Judicial
Conference ofthe United States, the administrative body overseeing federal judicial
operations, subsequently affirmed the Administrative Office's policy.2"' Such
monitoring is commonplace in workplaces around the nation.
Fifth Amendment issues abound. Among these are the following: questions
about when life begins and the limits of governmental authority to experiment on
human tissue triggered by such technological advances as cloning; medical research
involving embryonic stem cells; the extent to which government may restrict
individuals' access to medical expertise (such as on the Internet) to advance their
health or their own deaths, however they see fit; and the constraints on
governmental restrictions on organ transplants or governmental access to deceased
persons' body parts (such as corneas).
In other contexts in which it appears the law is more settled, it nevertheless is
possible to press existing doctrine. For example, in Marylandv. Craig,"2 the Court
addressed the legitimacy of a child's testifying by way of closed-circuit television
against an adult. At some point, the Court can expect claims to arise about the
legitimacy of video testimony in other contexts, including spousal abuse or
circumstances in which individuals are unavailable for live testimony. 2 3 Moreover,
the Court no doubt will continue to be subjected to increasing pressure to allow
cameras to cover its proceedings, live radio feeds of its oral arguments (as it
permitted in Bush v. Gore), and even public televising of executions.

With respect to virtually all of these issues, there is no clearly set or uniform
"conservative" or "liberal" attitude. Some "conservatives" undoubtedly will favor
no regulation or the most minimal public regulation possible in each of the areas
mentioned; others might construe the Constitution as empowering majorities to
resolve the regulatory questions posed in each of these areas; and still others will
See Neil A. Lewis, MonitoringofJudiciaryComputers Is Backed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2001, at A4.
281 See Tony Mauro, FederalCourts Adopt New Online Policies;Judicial Conference
Approves Monitoring of Court Computers and InternetAccess to Civil CourtDocuments,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 6.
280

2s2

497 U.S. 836 (1990).

3 See, e.g., Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926 (1 th Cir. 2001) (allowing testimony
via satellite in a case where witness lived in Argentina and was in poor health); United States
v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000) (allowing
testimony via two-way video link in organized crime trial).
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probably fall somewhere in between these extremes. Liberals are likely to reflect
equally divergent perspectives, with some perhaps favoring governmental regulation
to promote the general welfare in most or all of these fields, and others supporting
judicial review to protect privacy and other individual liberty interests implicated
in most or all of these areas. Liberals are likely to divide over whether individual
autonomy requires (1) increased access to as much information as possible, or (2)
greater protection from the loss of privacy entailed in accessing such information
or that is otherwise made' possible as a result of advancements in information
technology.2" 4 In short, neither "liberals" nor "conservatives" will necessarily have
predictable attitudes about how the Constitution applies (or does not apply) in these
cases.
Moreover, technological advances have changed governmental operations
both the Bork and Thomas confirmation hearings, for instance, were influenced
heavily by technological developments. In Bork's case, technological advancements
made possible the mass political organization and mass coverage of his hearings,
whereas in Thomas's case, the mediazation of the hearings helped to dramatize the
charges against him and his responses. By 2001, the twenty-four- hour news cycle
and the Internet have created increasing incentives for the media to devote much
more of their programs or space to speculation and commentary ("soft news") than
to reporting actual data and events ("hard news"). These "advancements" do not
necessarily make it easier for people to become informed, but rather cause the
public to depend on others as conduits for the information about public events they
think they need. Thus, technological advancements help to shape the very
environment in which we learn about them and their possible repercussions for
See J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?,90 MICH. L. REv. 1966,
1987-88 (1992):
28

Do traditional liberal notions of autonomy continue to make sense in an age
where control of information processing increasingly means new forms of
control over individuals themselves? Or has the liberal ideal of the free market
of ideas now turned in on itself and created a new form of totalitarianism, a
prison constructed from access to information rather than from steel bars?...
These issues strike at the heart of liberal political philosophy. Privacy is deeply
related to notions of individualism and individual autonomy... . What will
happen to the fabric of intimate relations in a world in which technological
advancement increasingly shrinks the domain of the private self? Will
traditional assumptions about personal privacy (and hence autonomy) still make
sense, or will they have to be reimagined in wholly different ways? And, if this
is so, what will happen to a constitutional jurisprudence based on eighteenthcentury notions of privacy and autonomy that assumed a world without our
present technological advancements?
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constitutional law.
Last but not least, technological advancements pose a fundamental problem for
the definition and operations of federalism. The physical geography outside of
cyberspace does not correspond to its internal architecture. If there is any
correspondence, it depends less on the preferences of state or federal authorities
than on the plans of web designers who currently answer to no one except perhaps
their customers or corporate sponsors. Hence, in cyberspace, the dividing line
between federal and state boundaries is illusory - it is not possible to detect
precisely where the scope of federal authority (such as its Commerce Clause power)
ends and state sovereignty begins.2 ' The concept of a community is dictated
largely, if not wholly, by the architecture of cyberspace - while it is true, for
instance, that America Online is a national operation, interaction among those who
use its services could be extremely localized (such as two users in the same
household) or purely artificial (such as in a chat room). A university or high school
can structure opportunities for interaction or instruction that, depending on the
services, are open to the world at large or only to its employees and students. In all
of these contexts, neither liberals nor conservatives have devised any consensus on
the criteria for defining the relevant community for constitutional or legislative
purposes.
Even though the Rehnquist Court has ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects only negative liberties and thus does not impose any affirmative obligations
on the state,1 6 many people worry about the dangers that state inaction with respect
to technological advancements poses for citizens. 8 7 These potential privacy
problems are myriad, including identity theft on the Internet; dissemination of
private medical information; 288 the use of "cookies" to track individual Internet
use;2 9 the spread of embarrassing rumors or tips across the Internet; the release of
videos onto the Internet (such as the women or doctors who frequent Planned
Parenthood or abortion facilities); and the burdensome requirement of opting-out
Larry Kramer, Puttingthe PoliticsBack Into the PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000).
286 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
27 See Edmund Sanders, Privacy Cases Not Yielding Much Payoff,L.A. TIMES, May 6,
2001, § 3 (Business), at I (asserting that "plaintiffs' attorneys are resorting to creative legal
arguments" and quoting a Washington privacy advocate as stating "'You have to stitch and
quilt existing laws to make it work .... It's not clean and it's not easy.").
288 This was the subject of a recent case in the New York state courts, Anonymous v. CVS
Corp., 728 N.Y.S. 2d 333 (N.Y. 2001), in which an individual with HIV/AIDS sued CVS
after the nation-wide chain bought his/her local drug store and then made his/her
prescription information available to every CVS store in the nation.
29 See In re Intuit Privacy Litigation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (denying
motion by defendant to dismiss privacy claims). Cf In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy
Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3498 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001) (granting DoubleClick
summary judgment and dismissing all claims with prejudice).
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of plans by businesses to sell their personal information. 9" This list is by no means
exhaustive; it expands everyday as technology advances along with the
corresponding social and legal challenges its growth engenders. Consequently, as
federal and state governments coordinate or tussle over regulatory solutions to these
problems, our conceptions of federalism - and the limits of the Bill of Rights will be stretched in ways yet to be conceived.
CONCLUSION

There is more to the history of the Bill of Rights over the past one hundred
years than the path of its interpretation by the Supreme Court. The history of the
Bill of Rights over the last century reflects the constancy of popular rhetoric about
the Supreme Court, regardless of shifting interpretations of the Bill of Rights.
Although the Bill of Rights has moved increasingly into the center of the Supreme
Court's agenda, its movement has not corresponded with a change in the terms
deployed in popular discourse about the Supreme Court. The terms remain the
same, while their referents have changed. Neitherjudicial activism nor restraint has
ever been a fixed "liberal" or "conservative" notion, but rather, depend on the
political authorities who control "the central interests" at, stake in constitutional
adjudication at a given moment in our history. The rhetoric parallels shifts in this
control.
The constancy of our rhetoric comes, however, at a price, because the
persistence of our rhetoric has limited utility. The constitutional issue that is likely
to dominate the Court's agenda over the course of the next century - the proper
relationship between the State and technology - is likely to challenge our
terminology in increasingly inconceivable ways. Liberals already have fragmented
in their attitudes towardothe expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights by the
Warren and Burger Courts, but they are sure to divide further when confronted with
the consequences that technological advancements pose for personal autonomy or
freedom over the next century. Liberals are not sure whether maximizing individual
autonomy requires more or less regulation. Similarly, conservatives have no
predictable or organized response to these advancements, which complicate
traditional notions of free speech, privacy, federalism, property rights, and limited
federal power.
As technology advances, the pressures to maintain traditional notions such as
judicial restraint and activism are bound to intensify. These notions persist because
they are culturally and socially ingrained, generally familiar, and trigger politically
salient imagery. Yet they are unlikely to capture the complexity of the
See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow, Jr., GettingaHandle on Privacy'sFine Print;Financial
Firms' Policy Notices Aren't Always 'Clearand Conspicuous' as Law Requires, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2001, at H1.
290

2002]

THE RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL CRITIQUE

645

consequences posed by technological advancements. The less effectively our
rhetoric captures this complexity, the wider the gap between practical and
constitutional reality. The bridging of this gap is the first great test that our fidelity
to the Bill of Rights will have in the twenty-first century: The more our technology
pulls us into the future, the greater the necessity of resisting the pull of our rhetoric
of judicial critique to imprison us in the past.

